The 1951 Refugee Convention : part of New Zealand law by Davis, Wendy.
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
0265 
1992 
• C 
WENDY DAVIS 
THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: 
PART OF NEW ZEALAND LAW 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
PUBLIC LAW (LAWS 509) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
1992 
v 
> 
< -• c/'. 

CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Summa,y of rhe Conrems of rhe Convention 
The Co11ve111io11 Defi11irio11 of Refugee 
Refugee Srarus Dererminarion Procedures 
The Obligatio11 of Non-Refoulernent 
1 Article 33: the prohibition against refoulement 
2 Does article 33 apply to all Co11ve111io11 refugees? 
3 Whe11 does a refugee become a refugee ? 
4 Ma11ifestly unfounded claims 
5 Is rejection at rhefromier refoulernent? 
6 Is the application of the "safe third cowwy" (or the "coumry uf 
first asylum") principle refoulement? 
II NEW ZEALAND'S DOMESTIC LAW RELATING TO REFUGEES 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
The Refugee Status Deter111inarion Procedure 
1 Histo,y 
2 Currell/ procedures 
(a) Application for rd'ugee status 
(b) Initial determination by Refugee Status Section 
(c) Right of appeal 
(d) The operation of the pnnctple of 11u11-refoule111e11t in 
New Zealand 
(e) Summary 
D1e Failure to Legislme 
D1e /111111igration Act 1987: Provisions aJjecting Refugees 
1 Visas, permits and remol'al procedures 
2 Carrier sanctions 
3 Transit visas 
4 
Policy 
Detemion 
Do New Zealand's laws comply with the Refugee Co11ve111io11? 
(iii) 
(iv) 
2 
5 
6 
7 
10 
l l 
12 
17 
18 
19 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
26 
28 
30 
III THE REFUGEE CONVE TION AS PART OF EW ZEALAND'S DOMESTIC LAW 
A 
B 
Description of Thesis 
Importation of the Refugee Convemion i1110 Domestic Law Through the 
Exercise of Crown Prerogative 
1 /111roduction 
2 
3 
Does constitutional principle prevem the i111portatio11 of 
trearies into domestic law through the exercise of Crown 
prerogative? 
D1e importation of treaties i1110 domestic law rhrough 
"prerogarive legislation" 
3 I 
32 
33 
38 
C 
D 
4 
5 
6 
(ii) 
Does judicial authority prevent importation by prerogative? 
(a) A treaty can not directly deprive a citizen of statutory 
or common law private rights or remedies 
(b) Treaties do not directly confer private rights or 
1 iabili ties 
(c) The provisions of an Act of Parliament prevail over 
inconsistent provisions in an international treaty 
(d) The use of treaties in statutory interpretation 
(e) Summary of the authorities 
Can the Refugee Convelltion be imported illlo domestic 
law through the exercise of Crown prerogative? 
Implications of the thesis that treaty rights may be 
imported into domestic law through the exercise of Crown 
prerogative 
/11corporatio11 of the Customary Rule of Non-Refoulement inro New 
Zeala11d law 
The Co11ve11tio11 as a Ma11datory Relevam Consideratio11 in lmmigratio11 
Decisio11-Making 
1 Immigration is a justiciable area 
2 Discretio11ary powers are reviewable 
3 The problem of Brind 
4 The Refugee Convention as a mandatory relevant 
consideration in immigration decision-making 
IV E DING 
APPENDIX 1 
APPE DIX 2 
APPENDIX 3 
APPENDIX 4 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Executive Committee Conclusion on Determination of 
Refugee Status ( 1977) 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority: Terms of Reference 
(l April 1992) 
Benipal v Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Immigration: 
Summary of Facts and Findings 
Summary of Constitutional Principles Relating to the 
Exercise, Nature and Reviewability of Crown Prerogative 
40 
42 
44 
45 
45 
46 
47 
51 
53 
55 
56 
57 
58 
62 
67 
69 
71 
74 
78 
83 
(iii) 
ABSTRACT 
The main thesis of this paper is that the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, and in particular the requirement to establish a procedure for the 
determination of refugee status and the duty not to return refugees to a place where they 
may face persecution, is now part of the municipal law of New Zealand. 
This paper begins with a brief description of the contents of the Refugee Convention, 
including the definition of refugee, with a comment on the adequacy of the Convention 
as a basis for international refugee law. Next, the paper describes the binding nature of 
the requirement for contracting parties to establish a procedure by which refugee status 
can be determined. The paper then describes and discusses some aspects of the nature 
and extent of the obligation not to return a refugee to persecution (non-refoulemenr). 
Part II of the paper describes the domestic application of refugee law, including the 
determination procedure by which the New Zealand immigration authorities decide 
whether asylum-seekers are to be granted refugee status and the provisions of the 
Immigration Act 1987 which affect those who come to New Zealand in search of 
asylum. 
Part III of the paper discusses the proposition that the Refugee Convention, including the 
duty to establish a determination procedure and the duty of non-refoulemenr, has been 
imported into the domestic law of New Zealand in three ways: first, by the exercise of 
the power of Crown prerogative, which has transformed the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention into domestic law; secondly, because non-refoulemenr is a customary rule of 
international law which, by the operation of the doctrine of incorporation, has become 
part of domestic law; and thirdly because the provisions of the Refugee Convention are 
of such overwhelming and manifest importance in an immigration context, that they are 
now relevant considerations which decision-makers are obliged to take into account when 
exercising statutory powers of decision which may affect asylum seekers. 
The paper concludes that legislation in this area of the law is desirable. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 22000 words. 
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I THE GENEY A CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 
A Summary of the Contents of the Convention 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1 defines who is a refugee2 and 
requires contracting states to accord certain limited rights to those who are granted or 
those who claim refugee status. The most important of these rights is the right not to be 
returned (refoule) to a place where the life or freedom of the refugee would be 
threatened3 . The Convention is not enforceable in international law by individual 
refugees4 • 
The obligations of contracting states towards refugees include the duty not to 
discriminate against refugees on the grounds of race, religion or country of origin5. 
Article 16 guarantees the right of access to the courts and legal assistance. Other 
provisions6 guarantee rights to paid employment and coverage by labour legislation and 
social security, and to housing, education and public relief?. Articles 25, 27 and 28 
provide for the issue of identity papers, travel documents and other necessary 
documentation to refugees. 
Article 31 ( 1) provides that 
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on 
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened ... , 
enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves 
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
Article 31 (2) prohibits Contracting States from restricting the movements of refugees, 
"other than those which are necessary ... and ... until their status in the country is 
regularized or they obtain admission into another country". Article 32(1) provides that 
"Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds 
of national security or public order". Such expulsion "shall be only in pursuance of a 
decision reached in accordance with due process of law". Article 32 applies only to 
1 Opened to signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150; in this paper referred to as "the Convention" or "the 
1951 Convention" or "the Refugee Convention". 
2 Article 1A(2). 
3 Article 33(1). The extent of the obligation of 11011-refoulemem is considered in Part ID below. 
4 GS Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in lmemational Law (1983) 134, (hereafter Goodwin-Gill (1983)). 
5 Articles 3 and 4. 
6 Articles 17 - 19. 
7 Articles 21 - 23. 
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refugees lawfully in the territory of the receiving state, while article 33, Prohibition of 
Etpulsion or Return (Refoulement), applies to all refugees. 
B The Convention Definition of Refugee 
The Convention defines a refugee as: 8 
any person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence ... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Refugee status, once acquired, can be lost in the circumstances set out in Article lC of 
the Convention, for example if a refugee voluntarily re-avails herself of the protection of 
the country of her nationality9 or if she "can no longer, because the circumstances in 
connection with which she has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 
continue to refuse to avail [herself] of the protection of the country of [her] 
nationality" 10 . The Convention does not apply to persons (specified in Article lF) who 
have committed crimes against peace or crimes against humanity, or who have been 
guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Nor does 
the Convention cover refugees receiving assistance from United Nations agencies other 
than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") 11 . 
Prior to the First World War, there was little need for a legal definition of "refugee". 
Numbers of refugees were small and immigration was relatively unrestricted. The large 
numbers of refugees created by World War I coincided with a rise in political 
nationalism and the adoption by Western nations of restrictive immigration policies. The 
need to cope with large numbers of European refugees required an exception to be made 
8 Above n 2. The Convention when first adopted applied only where refuge was sought as a result of 
events occurring before 1 January 1951. State parties also had the option of limiting coverage to events 
which had occurred in Europe, thus excluding refugees from other parts of the world. The 1967 New 
York Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (done 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267) removed these 
temporal and geographical restrictions (while saving existing declarations limiting state obligations to 
Europe). 
9 Art lC(l). 
10 Art 1C(5) and (6). 
11 (Art l D), for example Palestinian refugees receiving assistance from UNWRA (the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency). UNWRA operates in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. 
Palestinians outside the area of UNWRA operation may qualify as Convention refugees. 
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to these restrictive policies. This, in tum, required some means of defining who was a 
refugee12 • 
International instruments relating to refugees prior to the Second World War applied 
principles of humanitarian law to specific named groups of refugees who lacked de jure 
protection (for example "Russian refugees" or "Armenian refugees" who did not enjoy 
the protection of the Governments of the Soviet Union or Turkey respectively)
13 • 
The 1951 Convention was drafted at the height of the Cold War. The Convention 
definition of refugee is based not on membership of a group affected by armed conflict 
or violence, but on individualised fear of persecution where the human rights of the 
individual are not respected by the country of origin. The definition focuses on civil and 
political rights rather than economic, social and cultural rights. In 1951, this definition 
fitted the "conviction of most Western states that their limited resettlement capacity 
should be reserved for those whose flight was motivated by pro-Western political 
values" 14 • 
Groups of refugees fleeing civil war or violence but who are not threatened with 
persecution as such are not covered by the Convention (although they may be entitled to 
the protection of international humanitarian law)
15 • These "humanitarian refugees", who 
now comprise the majority of the world's displaced peoples
16 , are nevertheless assisted 
through the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") 
along with "Convention refugees" and may be granted temporary or permanent refuge by 
receiving states on humanitarian grounds 17 . 
12 JC Hathaway "The Evolution of Refugee Status in lnternatiooal Law: 1920 - 1950" ( 1984) 33
 lCLQ 
348 (hereafter Hathaway (1984)). 
13 Above, 354 - 355. 
14 JC Hathaway "A Reconsideration of the Underlying Basis of Refugee Law" (1990) Harv lnt ' l
 U 129, 
148. 
15 G Melander "The Two Refugee Definitions" in Repon No 4 of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute 
of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (1987) 17. 
16 K Hailbronner "Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International La
w or 
Wishful Legal Thinking?" (1986) 26 Va J lnt'I L 858 n 2. There are more than 17 million dis
placed 
persons under UNHCR care: Report of the Forty-Second Session of the Executive Committee
 of the High 
Commissioner's Programme, 21 October 1991, UN Doc A/AC.96/783, Opening Statement of
 the High 
Commissioner, 21. Most are in the third world (Report of the Forty-First Session of the Exec
utive 
Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 10 October 1990, UN Doc A/AC.96/760
, para 3 pi) 
and most are women or girls: (JC Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (1991) (v)); hereafter
, 
Hathaway, Law of Refugee Status). [n recognition of this and following Hathaway's practice, 
the feminine 
pronoun is used in this research paper. 
17 Goodwin-Gill (1983), above n 4, 11. 
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Many commentators consider that the Convention is an inadequate basis for international 
refugee law. 
Some view the Convention as outdated and perceive that it is being used in ways which 
were never intended 18 • Since 1951, when the Convention was drafted, previous natural 
barriers to movement such as the distance of Third World refugees from the countries of 
the developed world have been overcome with cheap and available air travel. The no-
exit policies of Eastern Europe (which limited the numbers of refugees arriving in the 
West) have disappeared. It is argued that refugee bona fides were once taken for granted 
on the basis that anyone willing to face the deprivations of a refugee camp must face 
even worse conditions at home. It is also argued that refugees who reach European 
states or other developed countries are possibly privileged compared to those in camps or 
otherwise displaced, since they have the money to pay for escape 19 . 
Other commentators20 criticise the Convention system because the protection system 
which it establishes is not even-handed. European refugees are routinely assisted by 
UNHCR to find asylum including third state resettlement, while third world refugees are 
contained within the third world by return, local resettlement and confinement in refugee 
camps. The Convention is defective, too, because the assessment of refugeehood as 
dependent on "persecution" is inherently subjective and politically malleable, depending 
on the receiving state's relationship with the state of origin21 • Nor does the Convention 
challenge the behaviour of states which produce refugee flows through the abuse of 
human rights22. 
Many voluntary agencies engaged in assisting refugees in camps and detention centres 
around the world wish to see a new Convention which expands the rights of refugees and 
18 Melander, above n 15, 10 - 11. 
19 D A Martin "The New Asylum Seekers" in D A Martin (ed) The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in 
the 1980s ( 1988) 8 - 11 (hereafter, Martin Asylum Seekers). 
20 J C Hathaway "Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection" (1991) Vo! 4 No 2 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 113, 114 - 115. 
21 R~garding the reluctance of New Zealand to grant refugee status to a refugee from India, see Benipal v 
Ministers of Foreig11 Affairs and Immigration (Unreported, 26 November 1985, High Court, Auckland 
Registry, Chilwell J, A 878/83, A 993/83, A 1016/83) 140 - 141, 151 - 153. 
22 J K Garvey "The New Asylum Seekers: Addressing Their Origin" in Martin Asylum Seekers 181. See 
also the Draft Declaration of Pri11ciples of International Law 011 Compensation to Refugees (International 
Law Association, 65th Conference, Cairo, April 1992). 
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the definition of refugee23 . Others fear that the process of developing a new Convention 
could lead to a more restrictive policy24 : 
[A]lthough the present position concerning the definition of the term · refugee' is analytis:ally 
untidy, in practice flexibility and pragmatism have been exercized to alleviate the suffering of the 
uprooted. These benefits might be lost in any attempt to define more accurately those who are 
entitled to refuge or permanent asylum. However, if the current definition of refugees is 
maintained, the receiving countries must accept the responsibility of developing more constructive 
refugee policies, both at home and abroad. 
Despite these criticisms and the limitations of the Convention in protecting both refugees 
and state sovereignty, it seems unlikely that the Convention will be changed in the 
foreseeable future2s. 
C Refugee Srarus Determinarion Procedures 
The Convention and Protocol do not specify the procedures to be followed in 
determining whether a person is a Convention refugee. However, inferences can be 
drawn from the wording of the Convention and Protocol, the UNHCR Executive 
Committee conclusions, and the practice of states. States are obliged to establish a 
procedure to determine whether a person is a Convention refugee26 . This:27 
follows from a straightforward reading of the Convention, from accepted principles of treaty 
interpretation, and from the rule pacta sum servanda28 . The purpose of the Convention 1s the 
protection of refugees, in particular to protect them against refoulemem. Lt follows that tht: 
beneficiaries of protection - the refugees defined in Article l - must first be identified . 
The determination procedure adopted must be suited to the purpose of the Convention. 
An interpretation of the Refugee Convention in good faith, according to Article 31 ( l) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "entails the result that Contracting States 
23 YMCA Refugee Crisis and Response. Report of the World YMCA Workshop on Root Causes of 
Refugees and Displaced Persons ([99 l); Report of the Forty-Second Session of the Executive Committee 
of the High Commissioner's Programme, 21 October 1991, UN Doc A l AC. 96/783, para 6 pl. 
24 Refugees: The Dynamics of Displacemem. A Report for the independem Commission 011 international 
Humanitarian issues ( 1986) 47. 
25 Comment by R G P Haines, Member of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority, at a seminar on Refugee 
Law organised by the Auckland Institute of Technology Refugee Education Programme, Auckland, 8 June 
1992. 
26 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria For Derermining Refugee Srarus under rhe 1951 
Convemion and rhe 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1988) HCR/IP/4/ Eng Rev 
l) para 189, p 45 (hereafter, UNHCR Handbook). 
27 R Plender "The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-Speaking Section of the Centre 
for Studies and Research" in The Right to Asylum (Hague Academy of International Law (1989)) 82 - 83 
(hereafter Plender Asylum). 
28 "Pacts are binding". 
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are obliged to make it effective, at least as regards its central purpose" 29 . The 
requirement to establish determination procedures is also part of a contracting state's 
undertaking to co-operate with the office of UNHCR in the exercise of its functions. 
States must "facilitate [UNHCR' s] duty of supervising the application of the provisions 
of this Convention "30. 
In 1977, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme adopted a set 
of basic guidelines31 which refugee determination procedures should satisfy. While 
UNHCR guidelines are not directly legally binding upon New Zealand judicial bodies, 
they are "of considerable persuasive authority" 32 . The New Zealand procedures, 
described in Part IIA2 below, comply with these basic requirements. 
D The Obligation of Non-Refoulement 
1 Arric!e 33: the prohibition against refoulement 
The 1951 Convention does not oblige contracting states to grant asylum, in the sense of 
permanent, safe refuge, to those who seek it, although article 14(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 194833 proclaims that "[e]veryone has the right to seek and 
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution". Legally, the right to asylum 
remains the right of the receiving state to grant refuge34 . 
Nevertheless, the Refugee Convention constrains the ability of a contracting state to 
return a refugee to a territory where she may be persecuted. Article 33 states: 
( 1) No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or 
29 Plender Asylum 83. 
30 Article 35 of the Convention and article II of the 1967 Protocol. Under these provisions, contracting 
States agree to make reports regarding the situation of refugees, the implementation of the Convention and 
laws and regulations which are in force relating to refugees. 
31 Attached as Appendix 1. 
32 Refugee Appeal No 1192 Re SA, 30 April 1992, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 33. What are 
generally referred to as "Excom Conclusions" are "sound in substance and consonant with the letter and the 
humanitarian spirit of both the 1951 Convention and other binding instruments relating to refugees in 
particular, and to human rights in general. Moreover, the Conclusions represent collective international 
expertise in refugee matters, including legal expertise": 32. 
33 UN Doc A/811. 
34 P Hyndman "Refugees Under International Law with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum" (1986) 60 
AU 148, 153 (hereafter, Hyndman "Concept of Asylum"). 
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who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly senous cnme, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country. 
The nature and extent of the obligation of non-refoulement under the Convention is not 
entirely clear. This section considers the interpretation of article 33( 1) of the 
Convention, and discusses at what point and to what extent a state is obliged to respect 
the obligation. It is clear, however35 , that the obligation of non-refoulement is an active 
duty to take steps to ensure that refugees are not returned to a place where they may be 
persecuted, not just a passive duty to refrain from returning a refugee should the 
opportunity arise. 
Non-refoulement "is a term of art covering, m particular, summary reconduction to the 
frontier of those discovered to have entered illegally and summary refusal of admission 
of those without valid papers" 36 . The obligation is owed to refugees regardless of their 
legal status under the municipal immigration laws of the receiving state
37 . 
2 Does article 33 apply ro all Convenrion refugees? 
The plain words of article 33 support a broad interpretation of the duty of non-
refoulement. Article 33(1) prohibits the return of refugee "in any manner whatsoever". 
This indicates an intention on the part of those who drafted the article that the duty of 
non-refoulement is not to be narrowly applied but should be taken to prohibit return to 
the state of origin in all circumstances where persecution may result. The use of the 
plural "frontiers of territories" extends the obligation to include a prohibition again st 
return to any territory where persecution may occur. 
However, the category of persons protected against refoulement by article 33 is defined 
in a slightly different, and arguably narrower, way to those defined as refugees in article 
1A(2) . A refugee is someone with a well-founded fear of persecution. The "well-
founded fear" test is now widely38 accepted to be that of a real chance or reasonable 
35 GS Goodwin-Gill "No11-Refouleme11t and the New Asylum Seekers" (1986) 26 Ya J lnt'I L 898, 902 -
903 (hereafter, Goodwin-Gill "Non-Refoulement"). 
36 Goodwin-Gill (1983) 69. "Refoulement may be defined as an administrative act, regulated as to its 
exercise by rules of international law, whereby the authorities . . . refuse to admit a particular person to the 
State' s territory, and thereupon return him to the country whence he came": Plender !11tematio11al 
Migration law (2 ed, 1988) 425 (hereafter, Plender (1988)) . 
37 Goodwin-Gill, above, 83. See also Hathaway law of Refu gee Status 50. Compare article 32, 
"Expulsion" , in which the prohibition against expulsion applies only to refugees "lawfully in [the] 
territory" of contracting States . See J Crawford and P Hyndman "Three Heresies in the Application of the 
Refugee Convention" (1989) I IJRL 155 , 176. 
38 Refugee Appeal No 1191 Re TLYand Refugee Appeal No 2191 Re LAB, 11 July 1991 , Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority , 7 . See al so Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ( I 989) 169 CLR 379 ; 
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degree of likelihood that persecution will occur. The chance of persecution may be as 
low as 10 percent39 . Nevertheless, the refugee applicant is to be given the benefit of the 
doubt40 . 
The duty of non-refoulement, on the other hand, is owed to those whose "life or freedom 
would be threatened" if they were returned to the country of origin. This may be a 
somewhat narrower group than those persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion41 . The words 
"would be threatened" may impose a requirement to show that such threats are "more 
likely than not" to occur42• 
This could be a more difficult test for a refugee to meet than showing a well-founded 
fear of persecution. If applied, it could theoretically lead to a receiving state granting 
refugee status because there was a real chance of persecution, but refusing to protect the 
refugee against refoulement because the risk that persecution would occur was not 
sufficiently great. However, it appears that State parties to the Convention have not 
relied on the narrow interpretation as a means of reducing the numbers of asylum seekers 
reaching their borders. Other methods have been used43 . 
There may also be a distinction between "persecution" and "threats to life and 
freedom" 44 . "Threats to life and freedom" could arguably be a narrower , more severe 
subset of the broader term "persecution". In my opinion, however, the word "freedom" 
as used in article 33 in a broad sense to mean not just physical liberty, but also freedom 
of thought, opinion and expression45 . It could also be read to include those types of 
/111111ig rario11 and Narumlisation Sen,ice v Cardoza-Fo11seca (1987) 94 L Ed 2d 434 ; R v Secretary of State 
fo r rhe Home Deparrme11t , exp Sivakumara11 [ 1988) AC 958. 
39 Chan , above , per McHugh J , 429. 
40 Haines , above n 25 . 
41 M Fullerton "Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights" (1988) 29 Va J Int'l L 35, 100 - 101. 
42 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984) also contains a prohibition against refoulement which applies "where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that [a person] would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture". The prohibition on refoulement in the Torture Convention applies to all persons, not just to 
refugees. Hence "humanitarian refugees" are also protected . The "substantial grounds" test is also 
contained in the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov 4 1950, 213 UNTS 222). Article 4 of 
Protocol No 4 of 1968 (R Lillich (ed) lntematio11al Huma11 Rights /11strumems 510 .4) prohibits the 
co llective expulsion of aliens where expulsion would violate their right to protection from torture and 
degrading treatment and /or their right to respect for family life . 
43 Fullerton , 94 - 114. 
44 Above, 101. 
45 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN Doc A/6316 (1966)) , arts 18 and 19, 
recognises these rights. 
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persecution which affect freedom in a broad sense, for example deprivation of access to 
basic educational facilities or prosecution for giving "illegal" religious instruction to a 
child. Given that the central purpose of the Refugee Convention is to enable those 
persecuted to escape persecution, the concept of persecution and "threats to life and 
freedom" should be taken as having the same meaning. A narrower interpretation would 
result in the purpose of the Convention being defeated. 
The differences in wording between the definition of refugee in article 1A(2) and the 
non-refoulement obligation in article 33(1) are probably of little practical importance. If 
a state is obliged to consider a claim for refugee status, and grants refugee status, it is 
hardly likely to return a refugee because she will suffer "only" persecution rather than a 
threat to life or freedom. A narrower interpretation would not be consistent with the 
obligation of contracting states to make treaties effective, would undermine the whole 
Convention, and would not, therefore, be an interpretation in good faith 46 . The 
practicalities of refugee determination also make it highly unlikely that state parties 
would attempt to apply different standards of proof to the determination process and the 
obligation of non-refoulement. 
If refugee status is not recognised, a refugee who has already entered the country will 
have access to the domestic courts to enforce any substantive or procedural rights 
accorded to her under domestic law. Removal will have to be effected in accordance 
with domestic immigration laws. At the border, however, non-recognition will lead in 
many cases to refoulement. If refoulement does take place, there is no effective 
enforcement procedure under the Convention for an aggrieved refugee, who is a 
beneficiary of but not a party to the Convention47 • 
While the Refugee Convention provides for states parties to take disputes to the 
International Court of Justice48 , in practice this never happens49 • UNHCR intervention 
to protect an individual refugee may occur (but is rare) . The only effective remedies 
available to a refugee for violations of the provisions of the Convention are those 
46 G Stenberg Non-Expulsion and Non-Refoulement (1989)) 219, points out that the more restrictive 
concept of persecution "would mean that a refugee could be returned to a country of persecution even if the 
conditions of Article 33(2) were not fulfilled. This would put into question the whole existence of the 
1951 Convention and , indeed, also that of the system of internat10nal protection of refugees as such, 
rendering it almost totally meaningless" . Stenberg also points out, 2 I 8 - 219, that the drafting history of 
article 33 supports the broad interpretation . 
47 A fortunate refugee may be assisted by prompt political action on the part of a non-governmental 
organisation, in the unlikely event that the organisation hears of the possible refoulement in time. 
48 Article 38 . 
49 Fullerton 104 - 105 advises that "[e]ach signatory is reluctant to critisize other signatories for fear that 
its own refugee practices will, in turn, be criticized·. 
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available in the domestic courts of the country of refuge
50. The fate of those refugees 
who do not gain access to those courts and are subject to refoulement for obvious reasons 
tends not to be known5 1• 
3 When does a refugee become a refugee? 
It has been argued52 that refugees do not acquire rights under the Convention until they 
have been determined to be refugees by the authorities of the receiving state. The 
obligation of non-refoulement would therefore not apply unless the authorities of the 
receiving state granted refugee status to a refugee applicant. 
The UNHCR Handbook, on the other hand, states that:
53 
[a] person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the cr
iteria 
contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his re
fugee 
status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make h
im a 
refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, b
ut is 
recognized because he is a refugee. 
This view is widely accepted as correct: 54 
It is not a government's acknowledgement of one's predicament that makes that individ
ual a 
refugee. Rather, it is the actual facts of his life - his well-founded fear of persecution .. .
 that 
make him a refugee. It is true that all asylum-seekers do not qualify as refugees; yet 
some 
asylum-seekers are refugees. Therefore, governments that tum away all or most asylum-seek
ers 
will likely tum away some refugees and violate Article 33. 
It can now be regarded as settled that the obligations of contracting states are owed to all 
those within their territory who claim refugee status as soon as refugee status is claimed. 
Those obligations cease to be owed to those who are subsequently determined not to be 
refugees within the Convention definition55 . 
50 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights The Human Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons: 
Protections Afforded Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons under /mernational Hum
an Rights, 
Humanitarian and Refugee Law (1991) 8. 
51 Crawford and Hyndman, above n 37, 168 (Mr Azemoudeh). 
52 See Fullerton 98 - 99. In Benipal, above n 21, 262, it was argued that once refugee status is 
recognised, the Convention affords protection to refugees, but that there is no protection prior
 to the 
recognition of refugee status. Hence at the application stage there was a need for protection u
nder 
municipal law. Chilwell J made no finding on this submission, which is wrong. 
53 Above n 26, 9. 
54 Fullerton 98 - 99. See also Hyndman "Concept of Asylum" 151; Goodwin-Gill (1983) 73; and 
Goodwin-Gill "Non-Refoulement" 902. 
55 Hathaway Law of Refugee Status 189 - 229. 
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4 Manifestly unfounded claims 
Some parties to the Refugee Convention have introduced "fast-track" screenmg 
procedures which authorise border officials to return, or "turn around", asylum-seekers 
with "manifestly unfounded claims"56 • "Manifestly unfounded" or "clearly abusive" 
applications are those which are clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for the 
granting of refugee status57 . In 1983, UNHCR recognised that: 58 
national procedures for the determination of refugee status may usefully include special provision 
for dealing in an expeditious manner with applications which are considered to be so obviously 
without foundation as not to merit full examination at every level of the procedure. 
The Executive Committee recommended that procedural safeguards be applied when 
assessing whether claims were abusive. These recommendations included59 the giving of 
a complete personal interview by a fully-qualified official (whenever possible by an 
official of the authority competent to determine refugee status); the establishment of the 
manifestly unfounded or abusive character of an application by the authority normally 
competent to determine refugee status; and allowing an unsuccessful applicant a right of 
appeal before rejection at the frontier or forcible removal from the territory. 
Those who submit abusive requests for asylum are "migrants who have to be handled 
within a refugee context because they have chosen to circumvent immigration policies 
and immigration rules by alleging fear of persecution "60 . A decision on a "manifestly 
unfounded claim" is nonetheless a substantive determination of refugee status61 . 
Domestic laws or procedures which result in refoulemenr of bona fide refugees because 
of "fast track" border determinations may be "so procedurally deficient that they run 
afoul of the Article 33 duty to refrain from returning refugees to persecution "61 . The 
obligation of non-refoulement does not, therefore, allow a less rigorous determination 
procedure to apply where claims may appear to be manifestly unfounded . 
56 See Fullerton regarding procedures in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
57 Report on the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, 20 October 1983, (UN Doc A/AC.96/631), Conclusion No 2, "The Problem of Manifestly 
Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum", 24. 
58 Above, para (d), 25. 
59 Above, para (e). Fullerton, 46, notes that the Belgian Minister of Justice may tum away applicants for 
refugee status who lack proper travel documents where a refugee claim is manifestly unfounded . Fullerton 
says this is "vague and broad" and confers great power on the police at the border. 
60 G Jaeger "Irregular Movements: The Concept and Possible Solutions" in Martin Asylum Seekers 23, 
26. 
6! Above n 57 , para (e). 
61 Fullerton, 96. 
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5 Is rejection at the frontier refoulement? 
The obligation of non-refoulement applies to all refugees who apply for refugee status 
once they have entered the country of refuge. There is no duty on states to grant 
permanent asylum to refugee applicants63 . However, a state may not return a refugee to 
a country where she is likely to face threats to her life or freedom without breaching the 
Convention64 • The receiving state therefore has only two alternatives; to admit the 
applicant (although not necessarily on a permanent basis) or to send her to a third 
country where she will not face persecution. 
In New Zealand, a refugee enters New Zealand as soon as she physically passes New 
Zealand's territorial boundaries65 . Although a refugee applicant may be taken into 
custody for security reasons66 , entry is not refused. Under section 4 of the Immigration 
Act 1987, if an applicant does not have a temporary permit, she will be present in New 
Zealand unlawfully for the purposes of that Act67 . Nevertheless, she will still be 
present , as a matter of law, in New Zealand. 
Some parties to the Refugee Convention refuse refugee applicants access to the 
determination procedure by denying the applicant legal entry to the country, even though 
physical entry has taken place and even though the applicant may be taken into custody 
and held in a detention centre68 . New Zealand does not subscribe to this legal fiction 
which, in the case of the Refugee Convention, is in breach of the general obligation to 
implement the provisions of the Convention in good faith
69 . 
If the term refoulement bears a broad meaning 7°, prohibiting return "in any manner", 
then protection against return extends to all those who present themselves at the frontier, 
regardless of whether they have reached the "other side" of immigration or customs 
controls. However, some commentators have argued that refoulement does not cover 
"rejection at the frontier" and that "turnaround" without entry is not in breach of the 
63 R Plender (1988) 415. 
64 M den Hond "'Jet-Age Refugees': In Search of Balance and Cooperation" in Martin Asylum Seekers 
49 , 53. 
65 "New Zealand" is defined for immigration purposes ins 2 of the Immigration Act 1987. 
66 Immigration Act 1987 s l28B . 
67 See Part II C below. 
68 In Gunaleela v Minisrer for lmmigrarion and Erhnic Affairs (1987) 74 ALR 263 it was held that persons 
who do not hold a permit to enter Australia and arrive at an airport which they do not leave (unless for the 
purpose of being kept in custody under the Migration Act I 958 (Cth) ss 5(2), 36A(8)) have not entered 
Australia. The Immigration Act (UK) 1971 s 3( 1) also maintains this legal fiction. 
69 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (done 23 May 1969, 8 ILM (1969) 679), art 31(1)). See 
also Goodwin-Gill (1983) 77 - 78; Fullerton, 99 - 100; Crawford and Hyndman, above n 37, 177. 
70 As I have argued in Part I D2 above. 
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Refugee Convention71 • However, most legal authorities do not agree that states may 
return persons applying for refugee status at the frontier72 . 
It is submitted that the obligation of non-refoulement includes the duty not to return any 
person who presents themselves to the immigration authorities on arrival and either 
directly or indirectly requests refugee status. This is so firstly because refugee status is 
claimed when the refugee no longer enjoys the protection of the country of origin. In 
international law, then, once a refugee has left the country of origin, that country loses 
jurisdiction over the refugee. The only state which may then exercise jurisdiction over 
the refugee is the country of refuge. That state is obliged to offer protection against 
refoulement to refugees whether or not it is a party to the Convention 73 . 
Secondly, the term re/outer is a specific legal term used both in Belgium and France to 
denote police actions without formality which are applied to aliens who are in the 
country in an irregular manner (those who in New Zealand would be called "illegal 
immigrants") and who are turned back at the frontier (rather than formally removed, 
expelled or extradited). "Return" is a "broad non-technical term "74 with a more 
extensive meaning than the concept of expulsion as used in articles 33 and 32. The use 
of the broad term "return" and the meaning of the technical term refoulement indicates 
that article 33 protects refugee applicants from actions such as rejection at the frontier or 
"turnaround". 
Thirdly, a frequently-made point is that it would be illogical to provide protection against 
refoulement for those who illegally succeed in crossing a border, but to deny protection 
to those who legally present themselves at the border75 • Fourthly, the duty not to return 
in article 33 applies to all refugees, whether or not they are legally present in the country 
in which they seek refuge. The prohibition against expulsion contained in article 32, on 
the other hand, protects only refugees who are "lawfully in the territory". Article 33 
71 Hailbronner, above n 16, 866 asserts that "the principle of non-refoulement has never been interpreted 
as exluding completely any possibility for police or immigration officers to return persons at the frontier if 
it appears that their applications for asylum would be unfounded". 
72 See above n 73; Plender (1988) 427; see also A Grahl-Madsen Territorial Asylum (1980) 40, 74; 
Stenberg, above n 46, 176 - 178; Hyndman "Australian Immigration Law and Procedures Pertaining to the 
Admission of Refugees" (1988) 33 McGill U 717, 736. 
73 See Part III D below. 
74 Crawford and Hyndman, above n 37, 177. 
75 Hailbronner, above n 16, 862 n 22. P Weis, "Territorial Asylum" (1966) 6 Indian JIL 173, 183 states: 
"It should, however, be pointed out that if Article 33 read in conjunction with Article 31 is not taken to 
prohibit the return of refugees who present themselves at the frontier, this would mean that the extent to 
which a refugee is protected ... [against return to persecution I would depend on the fortuitous circumstance 
whether he has succeeded in penetrating the territory of a contracting State". 
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contains no such restriction, and therefore applies to all refugee applicants, even illegal 
entrants 76 . 
6 Is the application of the "safe third country" (or the "country of first asylum") 
principle refoulement? 
Governments have also attempted to decline entry to refugee applicants on the basis that 
they are the responsibility of some other state77 . What began as an informal practice of 
returning refugees from countries of second or subsequent arrival to countries of "first 
asylum" has been refined and is now provided for in municipal and international treaty 
law 78. 
Return to the country of first asylum may create several difficulties. It may lead to 
eventual refoulement of the refugee to the country of origin. It may put the refugee "into 
orbit" 79 ; this description is applied to refugees who are passed from one transit lounge in 
one country to another, with no country prepared to admit the refugee to its territories 
and take responsibility for determination of refugee status. The country of first asylum 
could also persecute the refugee or have a completely incompatible religion or culture. 
The principle of responsibility of the country of first asylum has been stretched from the 
original principle that where a refugee had acquired refugee status in a country, or at 
least the protection of a state80 , that refugee should not be entitled to seek asylum 
subsequently in a third state and the third state should not be obliged to admit her. The 
principle is now applied in some states to exclude refugee applicants who have spent any 
time at all , even a matter of hours, in a third country en roure from the country of 
ongin. 
76 Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. See also above n 46, 176. 
77 R v Secretary of Stare exp Muboyayi [1991] 4 All ER 72 (CA). The country of first asylum principle is 
enshrined in the Refugee Act 1980 (US) (see Plender ( 1988) 425) . Canada enacted the safe third country 
concept in 1988 . The Canadian Cabinet may draw up a list of "safe third countries" to which refugee 
applicants may be returned if that state's "laws or practices" establish that they would be "allowed to 
return" to that country or that they would be able to have the merits of their claim determined there: 
Hathaway , "Postscript - Selective Concern: An Overview of Refugee Law In Canada" (1989) 33 McGill 
LT 354. The "safe third country" list has never been drawn up in Canada (see Refugee Appeal No 1192, 
above n 32 , 21-22). The Refugee Status Appeals Authority noted that Canadian jurisprudence does not 
necessarily recognise the principle, 28. 
78 Plender (1988) 424. Article 3(5) of the Dublin Convention Determining the State Responsible for 
Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities 
signed 15 June 1990, (30 ILM 425 (1991)) states: "Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to 
its national laws, to send an applicant for asylum to a third state, in compliance with the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention, as amended by the New York Protocol". 
79 Fullerton, 49 n 55 ; Plender (1988) 424 . 
KO Goodwin-Gill (1983) 55 considers that such protection requires as a minimum, the right of residence 
and re-entry, the right to work , and some form of guarantee against return to a country of persecution. 
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In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Muboyayi, the applicants 
fled from Zaire to the United Kingdom via France. The Secretary of State refused to 
grant the family leave to enter, applying the "safe third country" principle: 81 
[A]n application for asylum from a passenger who has arrived in the UK from a country other than 
the country in which he fears persecution, will not normally be considered substantively. The 
passenger will be returned to the country from which he embarked, or to another country in which 
he has been since he left the country of feared persecution or , if appropriate, to his country of 
nationality, unless I am satisfied that the country is one in which his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, or that it would return him to such a country. 
Even though Mr Muboyayi had been in France for only one day, the Court of Appeal 
refused to interfere with the Secretary of State's decision, because of the safe third 
country policy and the evidence that France would comply with the Convention in 
considering Mr Muboyayi's claim for asylum. However, in England the third country 
must be recognised as safe or the principle will not be applied82 . 
There has been much academic criticism of the principle that the state with the primary 
responsibility for determining refugee status is the country of first asylum. Crawford 
and Hyndman note83 that: 
[a]s a matter of comity, another State should not be presumed to be intending to violate its 
international obligations, but that is only a presumption . The primary responsibility is to the 
refugee, a responsibility which cannot be shuffled off by 'passing the buck' to a recalcitrant third 
State. 
Hathaway criticises the "safe country" principle because no decision on the merits of the 
claim is made; situations in other countries can change rapidly (and safe country lists can 
quickly become outdated); the concept injects a political element into the refugee 
determination process; and because it puts in doubt a signatory's ability to comply with 
the Convention (in particular the duty of non-refoulement). Once a claimant has been 
sent on or sent back to a third country by the chosen country of refuge, the immigration 
authorities of that country cannot ensure that the life or liberty of any particular claimant 
is not at risk84 . 
According to Hathaway the "universal scope of post-Protocol refugee law effectively 
allows most refugees to choose for themselves the country in which they will claim 
81 Reply by the Home Secretary to a written question in the House of Commons, 25 July I 990, 177 HC 
Official Report (6th series), above n 78, 83. 
82 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Depanment [ 1987] AC 514 (HL). 
83 Above n 37, 173. 
84 J C Hathaway "Selective Concern: An Overview of Refugee Law in Canada" ( 1988) 33 McGill U 
676, 703 - 708 and Hathaway Law of Refugee Status46 - 50. 
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refugee status" 85 . This statement has particular relevance in the Asia/Oceania region, 
where, apart from New Zealand and Australia, few countries are parties to the Refugee 
Convention86 . The chances of finding a "safe third country", particularly one in which 
the culture and religion are compatible with that of the refugee, are therefore limited. 
85 Above 46. 
86 UNHCR Handbook, above n 26, 86 - 87. 
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II NEW ZEALAND'S DOMESTIC LAW RELATING TO REFUGEES 
A The Refugee Status Determination Procedure 
1 History 
In 1978 procedures87 were set up under Crown prerogative to ensure that New Zealand 
complied with its obligations as a party to the Refugee Convention88 . This was done at 
the instigation of the Legal Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs89 in consultation 
with UNHCR. 
Under these procedures90 , individual applicants for refugee status made application 
directly to the Legal Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry made an 
initial determination as to whether the applicant was a Convention refugee. Applicants 
then appeared personally before an Interdepartmental Committee on Refugees ("ICOR") , 
along with counsel if they wished, to present their case and answer questions. ICOR9 1 
then made a recommendation to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, who 
made the final decision . The UNHCR representative for New Zealand (based in 
Canberra), was entitled to attend ICOR hearings as an observer, and applicants were 
advised of their right to contact the UNHCR representative if they wished. 
In practice, those recognised as refugees were granted residence status92 . For 
unsuccessful applicants there was no appeal provision apart from a general right of 
appeal to the Minister of Immigration against deportation "on humanitarian grounds" 
under section 20A of the Immigration Act 1964, or to the Deportation Review Tribunal 
under sections 22C and D of that Act. Applications for review were also possible93 . 
87 These procedures were detailed in interdepartmental circular letters dated 6 September 1978 and 11 
March 1981 and a statement of the procedures was sent to UNHCR on 7 September 1981 . 
88 The history of the setting up of these procedures is related in Benipal, above n 21 , 47 - 5 l. 
89 Now the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (MERD. 
9o Summarised in GS Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in /11tematio11al law (1983) 180 - 182. 
91 ICOR included representatives of the Departments of Labour (Immigration) and Internal Affairs, the 
Police Department and the Security Intelligence Service, and was chaired by the Head of the Legal 
Division of Foreign Affairs. 
92 Benipal, above n 21, 51. 
93 Above, 48 . In circumstances where a person had been convicted of an offence under the Immigration 
Act 1964, and was therefore liable to be deported, a petition to the Governor-General to apply the 
prerogative of mercy could lead to a stay of deportation. 
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Numbers of refugee applicants were low until 1987, when they began to rise rapidly94 . 
In 1990, Cabinet decided to constitute a new determination procedure administered by 
the New Zealand Immigration Service ("NZIS ") rather than as a foreign affairs 
concem95 . 
2 Current procedures96 
(a) Application for refugee status 
About two-thirds of refugee applicants arrive in New Zealand lawfully in terms of local 
immigration laws and subsequently make application for refugee status (for example 
following a political or military upheaval in the home country subsequent to arrival97). 
Statistically, this group is less likely to be recognised as refugees than those who claim 
refugee status at the border. 
Refugee applicants arnvmg at Auckland airport98 first come into contact with an 
immigration, customs or police officer. Once the applicant indicates that her arrival is 
"refugee-based", either by directly indicating a desire to claim refugee status or 
indirectly disclosing a fear of persecution in the country of origin, the officer is obliged 
to call in the duty immigration officer at the airport. An interview is held immediately. 
The applicant is granted a 30-day visitor's permit and is told to lodge a formal 
application for refugee status within that time99 . 
94 An average of 10 individual applications for refugee status was received each year in New Zealand from 
1979 to 1981: see Goodwin-Gill (1983) 181. In 1987 27 applications were made. By 1990, 
approximately 1200 applications were made: see "Report to the Rt Hon W F Birch, Minister of 
Immigration, on the Process of Refugee Determination", WM Wilson, 29 April 1992 (hereafter, "the 
Wilson Report"). 
95 According to the Wilson report, 10, the reasons for this were: 
(a) With rising numbers of refugees, the ICOR system became overloaded and a more efficient, less 
cumbersome determination procedure was needed. 
(b) It shifted the bulk of determination work from a largely policy advisory department - MERT - to a 
department whose main function is to process claims similar to those of refugee applicants. 
(c) It was unfair that the Government was the sole arbiter of refugee status, and the Government wished to 
provide for an independent appeal body. 
96 Where not otherwise sourced, information about these procedures was provided by Ms Maya 
Ameratunga, Refugee Status Section, NZIS. Any errors are mine. 
97 Many applications for refugee status were received after the pro-democracy demonstrations in the 
People's Republic of China in 1989. 
98 The vast majority of border claimants arrive at Auckland airport. A small number of border claimants 
arrive in other ways; for example, there is a steady trickle of ship-jumpers. 
99 The immigration officer then contacts the Refugee and Migrant Service, a private organisation which 
receives some government funding, which assists refugee applicants in finding accommodat1on, getting 
legal advice, and finding work. Refugee applicants are issued with work perrruts by N ZlS. However, 
those refugee applicants who cannot find work are entitled to claim a social welfare benefit: Social 
Security Act 1964 s 74A(l). 
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(b) Initial determination by Refugee Status Section 
Under section 19(1)0) of the Legal Services Act 1991, refugee applicants are not entitled 
to legal aid to get a lawyer to assist in preparing applications and to represent the 
applicant at the RSS interview (although legal aid is available for appeals to the 
RSAA) 100 . Following the interview, the RSS officer prepares a comprehensive report 
and makes a provisional recommendation. The applicant is invited to comment on the 
report before the final decision is made. 
The applicant is accorded refugee status in approximately 25 percent of cases. A 
residence permit is usually then granted. A further 25 percent of cases lodged before 18 
November 1991 are not granted refugee status but are granted residence on general 
humanitarian grounds under the humanitarian category of immigration policy current 
prior to that date. For applications lodged after 18 November 1991, the number of 
"humanitarian" acceptances is likely to fall dramatically, since the humanitarian policy in 
force after that date is extremely narrow 101 . 
(c) Right of appeal 
Applicants whose claims to refugee status are rejected by a RSS officer may appeal to 
the Refugee Status Appeals Authority established by Cabinet decision on 11 March 
1991 102 . The Terms of Reference of the RSAA were amended with effect from l April 
1992 103 . A UNHCR representative may sit on hearings as a non-voting participant. The 
Authority's function is: 104 
to make a final determination on appeal from decisions of officers of the Refugee Status Section of 
the New Zealand Immigration Service of claims to refugee status, that is , to determine whether 
persons are refugees within the meaning of Article l, Section A(2) of the 195 l Convention 
lOO The Wilson report, above n 94, l l, states that the effect of tlus exclusion from legal aid n~sults in a 
great deal more work for RSS officers "because they will be required to draw out from the applicant much 
material which would previously have been extracted by the lawyer acting for the applicant and place 
before the Immigration Service in a readily intelligible form. Officers will also face the difficulty which is 
inherent in combining the roles of assisting the applicant and then adjudicating on his or her application". 
lOl Humanitarian applicants for residence in New Zealand will now be accepted only if they already have 
a "close family member who is a New Zealand citizen or a New Zealand resident": Department of Labour 
(NZIS) Manual of Immigration !11structio11s Chapter 7 (Residence) 7-H-l - 7-H-8 November 1991, 
(hereafter, NZIS Manual). Many refugees will not meet this requirement. 
102 A Refugee Status Appeals Committee was established, along with the RSS, on 17 December 1990 (see 
above n 100); it was renamed the RSAA on 11 March 1991 (CAB (91) M 9/14). 
103 The current Terms of Reference are attached as Appendix 2. Cabinet agreed on 16 December 199 l 
(CAB (91) M 52/72) to allow the Minister to amend some of the procedural aspects of the Terms of 
Reference without further reference to Cabinet. The Minister approved new Terms of Reference on 18 
March 1992. 
104 Terms of Reference para 5. 
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Relating to the Status of Refugees, as supplemented by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. 
The Appeal Authority does not have jurisdiction: 105 
to consider whether, in respect of claimants who are not refugees within the [Convention 
definition], there exist any humanitarian or other circumstances which could lead to the grant of a 
residence or other permit to remain in New Zealand. 
Appeals are by way of de novo hearing 106 "unless the claim is prima facie manifestly 
unfounded or frivolous or vexatious, or manifestly well-founded" 107 . The proceedings 
are confidential to protect the interests of appellants . 
The RSAA adopts an inquisitorial procedure; the Authority considers that an adversarial 
hearing , with the appellant on one side and the NZIS on the other, is inappropriate for 
refugee appeals 108 . The formal rules of evidence do not apply. Cross-examination is 
allowed only by leave of the Authority, although the Authority considers that its 
questioning of the appellant is as rigorous as, and in many cases more rigorous than, 
cross-examination 109 . The appellant is entitled to an interpreter, and to have her 
representative present. 
The Authority must issue a written decision with reasons 110 . If the Authority cannot 
agree, the appellant is granted refugee status. Initially, the Minister of Immigration 
could overturn a decision of the Authority in "exceptional cases" 111 , but the Minister has 
now agreed that the Authority's decision is final 112• Approximately 28 percent of 
appeals are successful. This is an average rate of success for appeal-level cases 113 • 
While this figure has been used to provide evidence of the high numbers of unfounded 
claims, it means that one in four determinations by the RSS are incorrect 114 . 
105 Above, although Refugee Status Section officers may do so. 
l06 Refugee Status Appeals Authority Practice Note No 1 issued 2 July 1991, para 1. 
107 Terms of Reference para 8. 
!OS Practice note No 1, above n 109, para 4. 
109 Comment by the Chairperson of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority , 8 0 Nicholson , at a seminar 
on Refugee Law, 8 June 1992, Auckland Institute of Technology Refugee Education Programme. 
11 0 Terms of Reference para 15. 
111 Annex to Cabinet Minute CAB (90) M 46/22. 
112 Advice to RSAA, letter dated 4 June 1991. 
113 Comment by RPG Haines, Member, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, above n 25 . 
114 Above. 
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(d) The operation of the obligation of non-refoulement in New Zealand 
The Appeals Authority is developing an indigenous refugee jurisprudence in a series of 
thorough and closely reasoned decisions in a difficult area of judicial decision-making 115 . 
The concept of the manifestly unfounded claim has recently been commented on by the 
High Court in Silke Ali v Minister of Immigration 116 . This applicant arrived as a 
stowaway. NZIS refused to accept his application for refugee status, because a prior 
application for refugee status in the Netherlands had been refused 117 . The applicant 
applied for an interim order under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 preventing his 
removal from New Zealand. The statutory power of decision in question was the power 
of the immigration officer to refuse to issue a visitor's permit to the applicant. 
NZIS argued that the applicant should be denied access to the refugee determination 
procedure because he had already been denied refugee status by another Convention 
country. Barker J rejected this argument and granted an interim order forbidding the 
removal of the plaintiff from New Zealand pending the determination of his appeal by 
the RSAA. His Honour said: 118 
it seems to me that the Government having set up this elaborate appeal procedure , the pla1nt1ff 
must have the right to have his appeal determined in accordance with it. ... I cannot see that the 
fact the New Zealand Immigration Service refuses even to consider whether this man should go 
through the new process is other than saying that his claim is manifestly unfounded. If that is the 
case, then he clearly has been given a right of appeal against that determination. 
The RSAA 119 declined the appeal, but in doing so severely constrained the use of the 
concept of "manifestly unfounded claims" as a means of avoiding the obligation to allow 
a refugee applicant access to the refugee determination procedure. The RSAA approved 
Goodwin-Gill's opinion that "the chances of erroneous denial of access to the procedure 
are too great to justify any form of filter" 120 and approved the "compelling logic" that: 121 
the concept of manifestly unfounded claims is logically so narrow as to be practically 
unworkable ... Its maintenance as an enforcement tool renders it potentially open to administrative 
misapplication. Therefore, all claims to refugee status must be considered as substantive. 
115 Its decisions are held in the RSS of the NZIS. 
116 (Unreported, 13 December 1991, High Court, Auckland, Barker J, M 2270/91). 
117 Above, 10, and because he was "a flag state responsibility" . 
I 18 Above, 6 and 8 - 9. 
119 Refugee Appeal No 1192 Re SA, above n 32. 
120 Above 16. 
121 Above, 18 - 19. "What is manifest to some is often not to others. Refugee claims are generally of that 
kind. They address themselves to experiences and conditions in other countries well-removed from direct 
observation": Plaut Refugee Determination in Canada (1985), 96. A manifestly unfounded claim is not 
any unsuccessful claim: above n 32, 18. 
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The effect of these decisions is that all applicants for refugee status in New Zealand are 
now entitled to have their applications considered under the determination procedure. 
Since the categorisation of a claim as manifestly unfounded is a decision of a substantive 
character, a refusal to consider a claim at the point when an asylum-seeker first enters 
New Zealand may be the subject of an appeal to the RSAA. Substantive decisions on 
refugee status may be made in New Zealand only by officers of the RSS of the NZIS or 
by the RSAA. This requirement effectively prevents border officials from rejecting an 
application for refugee status on the grounds that it is manifestly unfounded. 
The High Court decision in Silke Ali and the decision of the RSAA in Refagee Appeal No 
1 /92 also established that the principle of responsibility of the country of first asylum 
(the "safe third country" principle) has no application in New Zealand. Access to the 
determination procedure may not be denied simply because the applicant has been denied 
refugee status in another Convention country with "an acceptable and civilised system of 
justice" 122 . 
Barker J noted that the Terms of Reference for the RSAA did not preclude applications 
for the grant of refugee status by persons who had been denied refugee status by another 
country, and commented that "one might not be quite so sanguine about legal procedures 
in some countries which are parties to the convention as one might be about procedures 
in Holland" 123 . 
In Refugee Appeal No 1/92, the RSAA stated that: 124 
[t]here is nothing in law or in principle to justify the refusal ro consider an application for refugee 
status on the basis that another State Party to the Refugee Convention has already declined an 
application by that person for refugee status .. . [n our view, the fact that the Dutch authorities 
rejected the appellant as a refugee does not prevent us from entertaining the appeal and 
con idering the case de novo. However, what was said by the appellant to the Dutch authorities 
may be highly relevant to the appellant's credibility. 
(e) Summary 
The obligation of non-refoulement operates in New Zealand to ensure that all asylum-
seekers are entitled to have their claims for refugee status determined in accordance with 
the procedures established by the Government. Applicants for refugee status may not be 
returned to their country of origin or sent to a third state by border or other officials 
without having the substance of their claims determined. This right is not restricted to 
122 Above n 119, 4. 
123 Above, 5. 
124 Above n 32, 28 and 31. 
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those who have lawfully entered New Zealand, but extends also to all asylum-seekers, 
including those without the documentation required under the Immigration Act. The 
concepts of "manifestly unfounded claims" and "safe third country" currently have no 
application in New Zealand. 
B The Failure to Legislate 
It is understandable that no statutory basis was provided for the ICOR determination 
procedure, since the conduct of foreign affairs is not usually regulated by statute. 
However, the decision not to legislate when the procedures were changed in 1990 was 
unusual, since apart from refugee matters, immigration matters have been 
comprehensively covered by statute since 1964. The opportunity to legislate to cover 
refugee matters was presented when the Immigration Act 1964 was repealed and replaced 
with the 1987 Act (shortly after the Benipal decision), and again in 1991, when a 
substantial amendment to the Immigration Act was passed 125 • 
There is general, indeed almost unammous, agreement on the desirability of legislation 
in this area126 • However, at this stage legislation is unlikely to be enacted in the 
foreseeable future. In my opinion the failure to legislate emanates from the desire of the 
Government to have maximum flexibility in this area: 127 
One consequence of the survival of the prerogative is that a particular power may not be subject to 
parliamentary or judicial safeguards that would be considered appropriate if the power was being 
conferred afresh by legislation ... (and i]t has evidently been more convenient for successive 
governments to retain prerogative powers in their ancient form than to modernise them. 
However, for the reasons set out in Part III B6 below, the failure to legislate may have 
left the Government with less flexibility than legislation would have provided. 
125 No l 13 of 1991. 
126 Submissions to the Labour Select Committee which considered the Immigration Amendment Bill in 
favour of the introduction of legislation on the status of refugees were made in July, August and September 
1991 by imer alia the Legislation Advisory Committee; the New Zealand Law Society; Amnesty 
International; and the Human Rights Commission. The Wilson Report (above n 94, 18 - L9 and 21) also 
recommends legislation. 
127 E C S Wade and A W Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law ( LO ed, 1985) 248 (hereafter, 
Bradley). 
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C The Immigration Act 1987: Provisions Affecting Refugees 
Although the procedures for determination of refugee status are not contained in 
legislation, several provisions in the Immigration Act 1987 affect the ability of refugees 
to come to New Zealand to seek refuge and affect the way they are received once they 
arrive. Virtually all developed nations have, in recent years, erected barriers to asylum-
seekers128. The effectiveness of these measures in reducing the numbers of spontaneous 
refugee applications in New Zealand has yet to be assessed. 
1 Visas, permits and removal procedures 
The general provisions of the Immigration Act require that all travellers to New Zealand 
must obtain a visa before proceeding to New Zealand 129. Once travellers arrive in New 
Zealand, they must, if they are not New Zealand citizens or exempt persons 130 obtain a 
permit to be in New Zealand 131 . If they do not hold a permit, they are "deemed for the 
purposes of [the] Act to be in New Zealand unlawfully" 132 . 
Persons in New Zealand unlawfully may be removed under the procedures set out in Part 
II of the Act. Those subject to removal may be taken into custody in certain 
circumstances133 . A person detained must be brought before a District Court Judge 
within 48 hours to determine whether that person should be detained in custody, pursuant 
to a warrant of commitment, or released 134. If a warrant of commitment is issued , the 
person detained remains in custody for 21 days, and is then brought before a judge for 
further consideration and at weekly intervals after that135 . 
There is a right of appeal on the facts or on humanitarian grounds against the issue of a 
removal order to the Removal Review Authority136 , with a further appeal on a question 
128 M Fullerton "'Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
European Convention on Human Rights" ( 1988) 26 Va J lnt'l L 35; Martin (ed) The New Asylum Seekers: 
Refugee law in rhe 1980s (1988). 
129 Sections 14 - 14E of the Immigration Act. Certain classes of travellers specified in Part I of the First 
Schedule to the Immigration Regulations 1991 are exempt from the requirement to obtain a visa. 
130 Immigration Regulations 1991 First Schedule Part II. 
131 Immigration Act 1987 s 4(1). 
132 Above, s 4(2) . 
133 For failure to supply an address for service (s 47(2)); if she is a prohibited person under 
s (7(1)); if there is a belief that the person may abscond within NZ (s 53(l)(d)); and for breaching 
reporting requirements (s 57(5)) or other conditions imposed by a District Court Judge (s 54(5)). 
134 Immigration Act 1987 s 55. 
135 Above s 56. 
136 Above s 63A and B. 
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of law to the High Court and Court of Appeal 137 • A refugee applicant refused residence 
could also appeal to the Residence Appeal Authority under section 18C of the 
Immigration Act, with further appeals to the High Court and Court of Appeal 138 . 
Judicial review of adverse decisions may also be pursued 139 . 
2 Carrier sanctions 
Carrier sanctions are penalties imposed on the owner or charterer140 of an aircraft or ship 
or other craft for failing to ensure that passengers comply with the immigration rules or 
laws of the country. Section 125 (1) of the Act provides that: 
The person in charge of any craft that is en route to New Zealand from another country shall, for 
the purpose of ensuring or facilitating compliance with this Act, from the time when the craft 
enters the territorial limits of New Zealand be responsible for preventing, with such reasonable 
force as may be necessary, the disembarkation of any person from the craft other than -
to enable that person to present herself to an immigration officer and to produce that 
person's passport. 
For asylum-seekers, arrival with appropriate documentation would be unusual. It was 
pointed out to the Labour Select Committee in 1991 that: 141 
[a]lmost invariably [refugees] will be obliged to use unlawful means both to leave their countries 
of origin and to cross other international borders to reach a final country of asylum. Indeed, the 
fact that an asylum seeker has been able to seeure a lawful passport, proper exit visas and travel 
documentation, has been found to be a negative factor in his or her claim for refugee status. 
Section 125(2) places the responsibility on carriers to ensure that all persons boarding a 
craft in another country have appropriate documentation for immigration purposes. 
Section 125 (4)(a) places responsibility on a carrier to carry the cost of passage from 
New Zealand of any person who was brought here by the carrier and who did not hold a 
visa and was not granted a permit on arrival in New Zealand. The carrier is also obliged 
to pay any costs incurred by the Crown "in detaining or maintaining that person pending 
the person's departure ... "142. 
137 Sections l l5A and 116 respectively . 
138 Sections 115 and 116 respeetively. 
139 There is also provision ins 35A of the Act for the Minister to grant permits in special cases as an 
exception to Government policy. 
140 As defined in s 2 of the Act. 
141 Submissions on the Immigration Amendment Bill 1991 in Relation to the Rights of Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees in New Zealand, R J Towle, Haigh Lyon and Co, July 1991 , 8. 
142 Section 125(4)(b). 
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Penalties for failing to comply include imprisonment for up to 3 months, or the 
imposition of a fine of up to $ 10,000143 for the person in charge of the craft and up to 
$20,000 144 for the carrier. These provisions, which place responsibility for carrying out 
immigration functions on to carriers, are extremely effective in encouraging airlines to 
prevent people boarding aircraft without appropriate documentation. While prosecution 
of airlines under these provisions is rare, the threat of prosecution has been effective in 
ensuring that carriers comply with the Act. A memorandum of understanding between 
NZIS and the main carriers to facilitate compliance with the Act is also currently being 
drawn up. 
3 Transit visas 
A common method of arrival for refugees coming to New Zealand has been to claim 
protection while in transit through New Zealand ports to other destinations. Prior to the 
1991 amending legislation, visas were not required by transit passengers. Section 14£ of 
the Act145 now requires certain persons classified by regulation to obtain a transit visa 
before proceeding to New Zealand. Section 14£(5) provides that the holder of a transit 
visa is not entitled to apply for any sort of permit in New Zealand; those who do attempt 
to apply for permits may be detained under section 128 of the Act146 • 
The Immigration Regulations 1991 specify 147 which persons are required to have transit 
visas. The persons classified are citizens of those countries from which in the past 
comparatively large numbers of refugees have arrived in New Zealand. The Schedule 
targets the likely route or mode of arrival of those people148 • 
4 Der em ion 
Sections 128, 128A and 128B of the Act provide for the detention of persons arriving in 
New Zealand in an irregular manner. These provisions were amended in 1991, 
following the decision of the Court of Appeal in D v Minister of Immigration 149 • In that 
case, the appellants, refugee applicants who arrived from Pakistan during the Gulf 
143 Section 125(6)(a); increased from $5000 by the Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
144 Section 125(6)(b); increased from $10000 by the Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
145 As inserted bys 8 of the Immigration Amendment Act 1991. 
146 See "Detention" below. 
147 Amendment No 1 Schedule lA. 
148 For example citizens of India, Iraq, Zaire or the People's Republic of China transiting through New 
Zealand to or from Fiji , Tonga, the Solomon Islands or Western Samoa. 
149 [1991] 2 NZLR 672. 
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War150 were not granted a security clearance by the police. The NZIS proposed to 
remove them. An application for review of the decision to remove was unsuccessful. 
The Court of Appeal drew attention: 151 
to the lack in New Zealand of any legislative provision for the temporary detention of applicants 
for refugee status while their status is being investigated ... [T]he present statute law does have the 
result that, because of the security risk in New Zealand, Government officers may have at times to 
send away, and perhaps back to persecution, persons who may have genuine reasons to fear 
persecution for their political beliefs. 
The legislation as amended now provides for such detention. Many of the people to 
whom the provisions of sections 128, 128A and 128B might apply are those wishing to 
acquire refugee status here. Section 128 applies to any person who arrives in New 
Zealand and does not apply for or is refused a permit and to stowaways . It provides for 
the detention and removal of such people other than in accordance with the normal 
removal procedures described above152 . 
Section 128 applies only during the first 72 hours after arrival in New Zealand. A 
section 128 person may be detained during that period by the police pending departure 
from New Zealand on the first available craft 153 . A warrant of commitment providing 
for detention for 28 days must be issued by the Registrar of the District Court if the 
person concerned is to be held in custody for longer than 48 hours15~. Such a person is 
not entitled to bail1 55 but if section 128A applies that person may be "released on 
conditions" 156 . If a person to whom section 128 could apply is not detained within the 
first 72 hours after arrival, section 128 does not apply. If such a person cannot be 
removed within the 28 day period, she must be released from custody and normal 
removal procedures apply157. 
If a person detained under section 128 brings review proceedings (including proceedings 
for a writ of habeas corpus), she must remain in detention pending determination of the 
proceedings 158 . The person cannot be brought before a District Court Judge until 28 
days after the date on which the warrant of commitment is issued, and may then be 
150 Special provisional Refugee Status Detennination Procedures were introduced during the Gulf War to 
deal with refugee applications . These procedures were criticised by UNHCR and non-governmental 
organisations in New Zealand as being in breach of the Convention . 
151 Above n 152, 676. 
152 In the year to 30 June 1992, 156 arrivals were "turned around" under s 128, usually because they did 
not have visas. Most of these 156 arrivals were from Thailand (20) and Iran (20) . 
153 Immigration Act 1987 s 128(5). 
154 Above, s 128(7). 
155 Above, s 128(15). 
156 Above, s 128A(4). 
157 Above, s 128(13) and (14). 
158 Section 128A(2)(a). 
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released if she satisfies the Judge that she is not likely to abscond or breach any condition 
imposed on releasel59. 
Section 128B provides for the detention of persons who arnve m New Zealand and 
whose eligibility for a permit is not immediately ascertainable because they may be a 
prohibited immigrant under section 7(1) of the Act. Section 7(1) applies inter alia to 
certain persons convicted of criminal offences, previous deportees, those involved in 
terrorist or criminal activities including drug offences, and those who the Minister has 
reason to believe are likely to constitute a danger to the security or public order of New 
Zealand or are members of an organisation which has criminal objectives. 
Section 128B persons may be detained in custody pursuant to a warrant of commitment 
issued by a District Court Judge until the Minister of Immigration makes a determination 
about whether section 7(1) applies to that person 160 • Bail may not be granted to such 
persons 161 . The warrant of commitment must be extended by the District Court Judge if 
the Judge is satisfied the person is a person to whom section 128B applies 162 . 
D Policy 
The NZIS Manual of Immigration Instructions contains Government policy relating to 
the grant of visas and permits 163 and instructions for immigration officers on how to 
apply the Immigration Act. That part of the manual relating to arrivals and departures 
is, at the time of writing, being revised to take account of the changes to the Act made in 
1991. The II old II provisions in Chapter 15 of the manual relating to section 128 do not 
mention the possibility that section 128 persons may be refugees. However, the manual 
when rewritten will contain a note to the effect that section 128 may be used only in 
compliance with New Zealand's international obligations to refugees. 
The updated manual will also make reference to refugee applicants in the instructions on 
the implementation of section 128B. The chapter on refugees 164 has not, however, been 
updated since the new determination procedures were introduced in January 1991. The 
absence of a comprehensive approach in the manual to applications for refugee status 
means that compliance with the provisions of the Refugee Convention depends largely , 
159 Section 128A(2)(b) , (3) and (4). 
160 Section 1288(3). 
161 Section 128B(l2). 
162 Section 128B(l l). 
163 Section 13A - 13C of the Immigration Act. 
164 Chapter 8. 
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in a practical sense, on the quality and extent of training given to those making decisions 
at the border and the depth of NZIS commitment to ensuring that the provisions of the 
Convention are adhered to. 
E Do New Zealand's laws comply with the Refugee Convention? 
It has been suggested that the provisions of sections 128 to 128B of the Immigration Act 
are in conflict with the Refugee Convention 165 • A detailed study of that contention 1s 
outside the scope of this research paper. However, my opinion is that that there 1s 
nothing inherent in these provisions which envisages or compels refoulement or other 
action contrary to the Convention. On the other hand, these provisions do not ensure 
that refugees are protected against refoulement. The important factor when considering 
compliance with the Convention is how these provisions are translated into action by 
those responsible for decision-making in this area. 
The RSAA expressed concern about the manner in which the applicant in Refugee Appeal 
No 1 /92 had been detained and noted that: 166 
it is also appropriate, when considering the question of detention, to bear m mind that detention to 
deter others may well violate the fundamental Convention obligation of 11011-refoulemem to the 
extent that incarceration encourages refugees to abandon their asylum applications and return to 
territories where they may face persecution. 
It has also been suggested that laws imposing earner sanctions on airlines who bring 
refugees to receiving countries 167 , preventing legal entry of refugee applicants 168 , and 
imposing visa requirements on those coming from refugee-producing states 169 conflict 
certainly with the spirit 170 and perhaps with the letter 171 of international refugee law. If 
this is the case, then the laws of most of the developed countries of the world, which are 
also parties to the Convention, are in breach of the Convention. Enforcement of 
international obligations in these circumstances becomes an academic issue. The 
165 Submissions to the Labour Select Committee by R J Towle 24; the Legislation Advisory Committee 
para 46; the Human Rights Commission 9. See also Lawtalk, Newsletter of the New Zealand Law 
Society, 25 November 1991, No 362, 5. 
166 Above n 32, 34. 
167 Fullerton, above n 41, 113 - 114. 
168 J Crawford and P Hyndman "Three Heresies in the Application of the Refugee Convention" (1989) l 
lJRL 155, 176 - 177. 
169 G Stenberg Non Expulsion and Non-Refoulement (1989) 292. 
170 Martin Asylum Seekers 13. 
171 Above, 67 - 69; see also Fullerton, above n 41, 37. 
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development or retention of an effective international protection system for refugees172 is 
a question of almost overwhelming difficulty; and it is not a legal question. 
l 72 See Hathaway "A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law" ( 1990) Harv lnt' l U 
129 and "Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection" (1991) Vol 4 No 2 Journal of Refugee 
Studies 113. See also B S Chimni "Perspectives on Voluntary Repatriation: A Critical Note" (1991) 3 
URL 541. 
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III THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AS PART OF NEW ZEALAND'S 
DOMESTIC LAW 
A Description of Thesis 
The mam thesis of this paper is that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (including the requirement to establish a procedure for the determination of 
refugee status and the duty not to return refugees to places where they may be 
persecuted) is now part of the law of New Zealand. The Convention has been 
incorporated into New Zealand law in the following ways 173 • 
First, the Convention has been imported into domestic law through the adoption by the 
Government of procedures incorporating Convention principles and standards through 
the exercise of Crown prerogative. In setting up these procedures domestically, the 
Crown has acted to ensure compliance with its international obligations under the 
Convention 174 . In acting in accordance with the procedures established by the Crown, 
the Crown is "applying the Convention procedure" 175 . 
Secondly, non-refoulement is a customary rule of international law and, since there is 
nothing in the Immigration Act which is inconsistent with this customary rule, the duty 
of non-refoulement is therefore part of the common law of New Zealand. 
Thirdly, the Convention is a relevant consideration which the Minister or the appropriate 
decision-maker, exercising discretionary powers either under statute 176 or under the 
procedures established under the prerogative 177 , is obliged to take into account when 
making decisions on immigration matters where refugee status may be an issue. 
173 The extent to which the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and in particulars 18(4) (Freedom of 
Movement) may affect the rights of asylum seekers is not addressed in this paper. 
174 Benipal v Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Immigration above n 21, 47 and 237. 
175 Above, 51. 
l 76 For example, the decision whether to issue a permit under the Immigration Act. 
177 For example, the decision whether to grant refugee status to an applicant. 
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B Importation of the Refugee Convention into Domestic Law Through the Exercise 
of Crown Prerogative 
1 Introduction 
The powers of the Crown must either be derived from Act of Parliament or be 
recognised as a matter of common law 178 . In 1992 the vast majority of the Crown's 
activity is authorised through Act of Parliament 179 , yet a significant number of the 
Crown's activities are carried on under the authority of the prerogative, for example the 
executive powers of the Crown to govern and powers relating to foreign affairs 180 
including the power to enter into treaties 181 . 
Several writers state without reservation that treaties may be implemented, as opposed to 
entered into, only under the authority of statute. Wade says that "there is no prerogative 
power to enforce treaties" 182 . The New Zealand Commentary states that "a treaty is not 
part of domestic law unless it has been adopted by statute and cannot affect clear 
provisions in a statute" 183 . 
If there is an absolute prohibition on the domestic implementation of international treaties 
other than by legislation, the proposition that the provisions of the Refugee Convention 
have been incorporated into the common law of New Zealand through the exercise of 
prerogative powers is incorrect. This section of the paper examines whether in principle 
treaties are able to be incorporated into domestic law through the exercise of 
178 "The prerogative is .. . created and limited by the common law, and the Sovereign can claim no 
prerogatives except such as the law allows, nor such as are contrary to Magna Carta or any other statute, or 
to the liberties of the subject": Halsbury 's Laws of England ( 4 ed) vol 8 Constitutional Law para 890 p 
583 (hereafter, Halsbury). A summary of the constitutional principles relating to the exercise, nature and 
reviewability of Crown prerogative is contained in Appendix 4 to this research paper. 
179 EC S Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (10 ed, 1985) 247 (hereafter 
Bradley). 
180 Bradley, 248 - 252, lists the main areas in which the prerogative is exercised today. 
181 Blackbum v Attorney-General (1971] 2 All ER 1380 (CA); Bradley, 249. 
182 H WR Wade Administrative Law (6 ed, 1988) 241; although at 830, citing Walker v Baird (1892] 
AC 491, Wade states the principle in slightly narrower terms: "The enforcement of treaties, so far as it 
affects the rights of persons within the jurisdiction, must be authorised by Act of Parliament". De Smith 
considers that "neither a declaration nor any other judicial remedy is obtainable for the purpose of ... 
securing performance of an international obligation undertaken by the Crown unless the obligation has 
been incorporated into municipal law by statute": JM Evans de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action (4 ed, 1980) 499. Emphasis added. 
183 NZ Commentary on Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed) Vo! F Chapter 149 (Statutes) para 870, p 28. 
Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 per Cooke J at 224 is cited as authority for this 
proposition. See also Brind v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 1991] 1 All ER 720 (HL); 
Simsek v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ( l 982) 40 ALR 6 l. 
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"prerogative legislation", and, if they are, whether in any case judicial authority requires 
that the adoption of treaties domestically should not take place in this way. 
My conclusion, after a consideration of the authorities discussed below, is that the 
statements of Wade and the New Commentary are unnecessarily restrictive; in a narrow 
range of cases, the importation of treaties by prerogative is legally and constitutionally 
acceptable and there is no direct binding or highly persuasive judicial authority to the 
contrary. 
2 Does constitutional principle prevent the importation of treaties into domestic law 
rhrough rhe exercise of rhe prerogative? 
In Benipal v Ministers of Foreign Affairs and lmmigration 1'd4 , Chilwell J found that "the 
executive may, at domestic level, implement treaty obligations in a non statutory 
way" 185 . Several authorities in support of the position that treaty obligations have no 
legal effect upon the rights and duties of the subjects of the Crown were cited to Chilwell 
Jl 86 . However, His Honour decided that: 187 
[i]n the light of the CCSU decision, it seems to me that little is to be gained by considering the 
authorities last cited because the House of Lords has decided that executive action is not 
necessarily immune from judicial review merely because it was carried out in pursuance of a 
power derived from a prerogative source. 
With respect, those authorities were cited as being relevant to the issue of the effect of 
treaty obligations on domestic law, not the issue of reviewability. In CCSU there was no 
discussion of the implementation of international conventions through the exercise of 
prerogative powers 188 . It appears that Chilwell J mixed two separate issues: the first, 
whether the direct exercise of prerogative powers is reviewable; and the second whether 
treaty obligations can be imported into domestic law through the exercise of prerogative 
powers. Nevertheless, it is submitted that his statement that treaty obligations may be 
imported into domestic law in a non-statutory way is correct as a matter of principle. 
184 Since the judgment in Benipal has never been reported, and because it will continue to influence legal 
and policy consideration of refugee law in New Zealand for some time to come, a summary of the facts and 
of the main findings is contained in Appendix 3 to this research paper. 
185 Above n 21, 264. 
186 Above n 21, 263: Rustomjee v The Queen (1876) l QB 487; Civilia11 War Claimams Association Ltd 
v The King [ I 932) AC 14; Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [ 194 I] AC 308; Republic of !raly v 
Hambros Bank Ltd [ 1950] l Ch 314; Buck v A((omey-General [ 1965] l Ch 745; Laker Airways Ltd v 
Department of Trade [1977) 2 All ER 182; Malone v Metropoliran Police Commissioner [1979) 2 WLR 
700; Ashby, above n 186; Simsek v Minisrer of Immigration a11d Eth11ic Affairs ( 1982) 40 ALR 61. 
187 Above n 21, 264. 
188 Except for an aside by Lord Fraser, 946. 
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The relevant principles of constitutional and international law are set out below. 
(a) Crown prerogative may be exercised only in an area in which the common law 
recognises the existence of Crown prerogative 189 . The categories of the prerogative are, 
in general, closed and may not be extended 190 • 
The power to control the entry of aliens is a prerogative power191 • In New Zealand, this 
power has been all but superseded by statute. The Immigration Act 1987 contains a 
comprehensive set of rules relating to the conditions under which travellers are able to 
enter New Zealand 192 and does not reserve prerogative powers to the Crown 193 . 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that to the extent that the Immigration Act does not deal 
with a particular immigration matter (and to that extent only), the Crown has authority to 
act in that matter by virtue of its prerogative powers. 
This question was considered in Chandra v Minisrer of Immigrarion 194 . In the course of 
argument about the nature of the Minister's discretionary power to grant or refuse a 
residence permit, counsel for the Minister submitted that the royal prerogative to exclude 
aliens must apply except to the extent that it was specifically affected by statute195 . 
Commenting on this submission, Barker J referred 196 to Lucas v Coleman 197 • In that 
case, O'Regan J had said that subject to the provisions of the Act , the common law 
applied in the area of immigration. 
Barker J identified a "legislative trend" away from the common law classification of 
immigrants to a completely statutory regulated process" 198 and commented that: 199 
from a comrnonsense point of view there is much to be said for ... [the) submission that the old 
concept of the Royal prerogative to keep foreigners at bay has been superseded by the modem 
transportation and the mass population movements of the 20th century. 
Nevertheless , he found that it was "undoubtedly true" that the common law applied 
unless modified by statute200 • It is submitted that on the authority of Chandra and Lucas 
189 Bradley, 254. 
l90 BBC v Johns [1965] Ch 32, per Diplock LJ, 79. 
191 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149, per Lord Denning at 168; Bradley, 
250. 
I 92 See above, Part IIC. 
193 Compare the External Relations Act 1988 s 13. 
194 [1978] 2 NZLR 559. 
195 It appears (568) that this argument was put forward to draw a distinction between the rules applying to 
aliens and the rules applying to Commonwealth citizens. 
196 Above, 567 . 
197 Unreported, 27 March 1975, Wellington Registry, M 134/75. 
198 Above. 
199 Above n 197, 568. 
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v Coleman, prerogative power may still be exercised m the admittedly small area of 
immigration matters not covered by the Immigration Act as long as the exercise of 
prerogative power is not inconsistent with the provisions of that Act. 
(b) The doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament means that the extent and the 
use of the prerogative may be curtailed at any stage and in any manner by legislation201 . 
The doctrine also requires that in the event of conflict between a purported use of the 
prerogative and the provisions of a statute, the provisions of the statute will prevail2°2 . 
Further, if a statute gives power to the Crown in an area in which the Crown may also 
act pursuant to the prerogative, the Crown must act under the authority of the statute and 
not by virtue of the prerog~tive203 . 
However, if the area is not one in which Parliament has decided to legislate (and if 
existing common law is not disturbed204) then there is no impediment to the exercise of 
prerogative powers. 
(c) While the vast majority of legislative acts are Acts of Parliament, the Crown retains 
a residual power of "prerogative legislation", albeit in a small and strictly defined 
area: 205 
While one result of the l 7th-century constitutional conflict was to impose very severe limits on the 
authority of the Crown to make new law without the approval of Parliament, certain lcgislat1vt! 
powers of the Crown have survived. 
The Crown may "legislate" without the authority of Parliament within the areas 
recognised as areas in which the Crown may act under the prerogative. The Order in 
Council in CCSU was "prerogative legislation". The setting up of tribunals under the 
prerogative206 is akin to legislation, although the form of the document setting up such 
bodies may not be traditionally legislative. The setting up of refugee determination 
200 Above, although Barker J stated that for the purposes of reviewability of immigration dec1s1ons "the 
point must now be reached where the common law has been so overlaid by statutory provisions that any 
analogy with the common law could be misleading". 
20! Bradley, 252 - 253. 
202 See the principles summarised in Appendix 4. 
203 Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel [ 1920) AC 508; Laker Airways Ltd v Departmellt of 
Trade above n . A statute does not necessarily remove prerogative powers, even if they are not expressly 
preserved: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, exp Northumbria Police Aurhority [ 1989) QB 
26; [ 1988] 1 All ER 556 cited to All ER. 
204 Halsbury, vol 8, para 920 p 595 - 596. "Prerogative legislation" for the purposes of this paper is 
defined as the limited authority of the Crown to make new law by formal decision or declaration. 
205 Bradley, 43. Halsbury, vol 8, para 908 p 592 advises that Magna Carta (1297), the Petition of Right 
( 1627), the Bill of Rights ( 1688) and the Act of Settlement ( I 700) "must not be regarded as curtailments of 
existing prerogatives, but as declarations of the fundamental laws of England": 2 Co Inst proem 3. 
206 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, exp Lain [ 1967] 2 QB 864; [ 1967] 2 All ER 770. 
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procedures is also "legislation by prerogative" 207 . 
"prerogative legislation" must take208 . 
There 1s no set form which 
(d) The doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament also controls the extent to 
which international law may be imported into domestic law. "International law is part of 
the law of the land, but it yields to statute" 209 . General principles of international law210 
are incorporated directly into municipal law, as long as they are not inconsistent with 
Acts of Parliament211 or prior judicial decisions of final authority212 . This is the 
traditional rule of common law213. 
(e) The rules relating to treaties are an exception to this common law rule. There is a 
rule that treaties do not have direct effect in domestic law and are subject to a doctrine of 
transformation21 4. However, the rule is not absolute and applies only to certain classes 
of treaties. Brownlie, for example, concludes that: 215 
treaties are only part of English law if an enabling Act of Parliament has been passed. This rule 
applies to treaties which affect private rights or liabilities, result in a charge on public funds , or 
require modification of the common law or statute for their enforcement in the courts . The rule 
does not apply to treaties relating to the conduct of war or treaties of cession. 
Halsbury states the proposition more broadly than the New Zealand Commentary: 216 
[A]ny treaty which requires a change in English law in order to make that law conform with the 
provisions of the treaty, and thus ensure that those provisions are cognisable and enforceable in 
the English courts, requires that the necessary legislation be enacted. 
207 Compare J B Elkind and A Shaw "Municipal Enforcement of the Prohibition against Racial 
Discrimination" (1984] BYIL 190, 240 who argue that treaty obligations may be imported merely by 
"policy deci sions". 
208 Bradley , 60 and 70; Halsbury, vol 8, para 1087 pp 670 - 678. 
209 Che11ey v Co11n (1968] l All ER 779 , 781 (per Ungoed-Thomas J). See also Morre11sen v Peters 
(1906) 8 F (J) 93. 
210 Customary rules of international law. 
2 l l Che11ey v Co11n above n 209 . 
212 Chu11g Chi Cheung v The King (1939] AC 160; Polites v The Commo11wealth (1945) 70 CLR 60. See 
also I Brownlie Pri11ciples of Public lmernatio11al law (4 ed, I 990) above n , 43 . For a more recent 
authority, see R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, exp Choudhury [ 199 lJ l All ER 306, 320 -
322 per Watkins U. 
213 Cheney v Conn, above n 209, 781, citing Oppe11heim's /mernarional law (8 ed), 40. 
214 Bradley, 47 - 48. 
215 Brownlie Public Internatio11al law, 48. Bradley states (304): "[A]lthough the executive has a largely 
unfettered power to enter into treaty obligations, 11ormally such obligations need to be implemented by 
domestic legislation before they will be enforced as law by courts in the United Kingdom ... The general 
rule ... may be subject to exceptions". Emphasis added. 
216 Volume 18 Foreign Relations Law para 1405 p 719. See also the finding of Lord Diplock in Salomon 
v Commissio11ers of Customs and Excise (1967] 2 QB 116; (1966] 3 All ER 871, 875: "Where by a 
treaty Her Majesty's Government undertakes ... to secure a specified result which can only be achieved by 
legislatio11, the treaty, since in English law it is not self-operating, remains irrelevant to any issue in the 
English courts until Her Majesty's Government has taken steps by way of legislation to fulfil its treaty 
obligations". Emphasis added. 
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The reason why the transformation doctrine must be applied in relation to treaties is not 
because, in principle, international law may not be incorporated directly into domestic 
law. If "a body of rules which nations accept among themselves" 217 (customary 
international law) is incorporated directly into domestic law, then there is no reason in 
the constitutional principles governing the relationship between domestic and 
international law why the same or similar rules agreed on positively in an international 
Convention may not also be directly incorporated. 
The reason for the rule is based rather on the domestic relationship between the authority 
of Parliament and Crown prerogative: 218 
In England, and also it seems in most Commonwealth countries, the conclusion and ratification of 
treaties are within the prerogative of the Crown (or its equivalent), and if a transformation 
doctrine were not applied, the Crown could legislate for the subject without Parliamentary 
consent. 
In many cases, international treaties, and particularly commercial treaties, will affect the 
private rights of citizens. In these cases, the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament 
will not allow the law to be altered through the operation of prerogative powers219 . 
However, the purpose of the rule that the Crown may not, through the exercise of the 
prerogative, alter the statutory or common law rights of citizens is a rule which exists to 
prevent the Crown purporting to override the authority of Parliament and the courts. 
The rule was not developed to prevent rules of international law being imported into 
domestic law. 
Elkind and Shaw220 argue that international treaties may be (directly) incorporated into 
domestic law through the operation of the rule of customary rule of international Jaw 
pacra sunt servanda. While this proposition is logically correct, it fails to give sufficient 
weight to constitutional concerns about abuse of power by the Crown; not by the 
sovereign, but by her Cabinet advisers221 . Because of the extent of the power of the 
Cabinet under present constitutional arrangements, it is submitted that in practical terms 
something more than an analogy with or use of the rules relating to customary 
international law is required before international treaties can be incorporated into 
domestic Jaw without Parliamentary legislation. The transformation doctrine should still 
217 Chung Chi Cheung v The King, above n 215, 167 - 168 per Viscount Simonds . 
218 Brownlie Public International law 47 - 48. See also Halsbury, above n 181, n 2; C Greenwood 
"The International Tin Council Litigation" All ER Rev 1989, 240, 245. 
219 Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 76. See Bradley, 61. 
220 Above n 210, 240. 
221 See Fitzgerald v Muldoon[l976] 2 NZLR 615; Bradley, 53 - 55. 
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be applied because it is a constitutional check on possible abuse of power222 . The Crown 
should not be able to "legislate" at will without Parliament and needs effective reminders 
that the power to "legislate" may be used only in a very closely-defined area. 
If the Crown is to use its constitutional ability to "legislate" without Parliament, then it 
should be subject to some means of public accountability in respect of the use of that 
power. These additional constraints, which in the case of the Refugee Convention are 
satisfied, should be: 
(a) a conscious decision on the part of the executive (additional and subsequent to the 
ratification or signing of a treaty) that it intends to act to comply with the provisions of 
the Convention and to adopt them as domestic law; 
(b) a formal decision by Cabinet; 
(c) publication of this decision in some formal way223 . 
3 The imporrarion of rrearies inro domesric law rhrough "prerogative legislmion" 
These principles set out above describe our constitutional hierarchy of law making and 
determination. Parliamentary legislation prevails over common law, Crown prerogative 
and international law in the event of inconsistency or where statutory rules have been 
clearly adopted by Parliament in the area concerned. Common law224 prevails over the 
exercise of Crown prerogative (if the exercise of Crown prerogative infringes on the 
rights and liberties of citizens protected by common law) and over inconsistent rules of 
international law. At the bottom of this hierarchy of law-creating powers are Crown 
prerogative and international law (both customary and treaty law). 
In the residual area left over from the operation of statute and common law, law may be 
made by "prerogative legislation" (defined above as the limited authority of the Crown to 
make new law by formal decision or declaration). The Crown's authority to "legislate" 
in this way empowers it to import into domestic law the provisions of a treaty if the 
provisions of that treaty: 
(a) operate in an area in which the Crown may act under the prerogative225 ; 
(b) deal with subjects which are not dealt with by Parliamentary legislation226 ; and 
222 Because customary rules tend to be developed (although not in all cases) gradually and are slow to be 
recognised, they do not have the same potential as treaties to affect domestic legal rights. The possibility 
of conflict between domestic law and customary international law is not as great. 
223 Halsbury, above n 211, states that there is no set form for "prerogative legislation" (defined above, n 
204). 
224 For the purposes of this part of the paper, common law means non-statutory law declared by the courts 
excluding Crown prerogative. Crown prerogative may in other contexts be referred to as part of common 
law: see Appendix 4. 
225 See Part III B2(a); BBC v Johns, above n 193. 
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(c) do not alter or purport to alter the rights of citizens as established by statute or 
finally-determined common law221. 
This submission does not challenge fundamental constitutional principles about the 
separation of powers, the relationship between the prerogative and statute, nor the 
limited nature of the prerogative. "Legislation by prerogative" does not challenge the 
authority of Parliament if Parliament has not decided to legislate in a particular area 
where prerogative powers exist. If there is no change to finally determined common 
law, then judicial authority is not challenged. If the matter is "prerogative subject-
matter", then the prerogative is not being extended. 
Nor does it offend the rule that rights conferred by an international treaty are not 
imported directly into municipal law. The transformation doctrine still applies. A 
deliberate act of adoption must still be done228 , albeit a "prerogative act" rather than an 
Act of Parliament. 
The contention that treaty rights may be imported into municipal law through the 
exercise of the prerogative is an issue about how the provisions of an international treaty 
may be transformed into municipal law, not whether those provisions have a direct effect 
on municipal law. The prerogative can be the conduit through which a treaty becomes 
part of municipal law; it is the source of authority for the law, but it is not the law 
itself229 . It will be submitted below that the law itself, as far as the treatment of refugee 
applicants in New Zealand is concerned, is now the Refugee Convention as applied by 
the RSS and the RSAA. 
As a matter of principle, then, Chilwell J's decision that treaty obligations may be 
incorporated into New Zealand law other than by statute is correct. There is nothing in 
principle which compels the courts to adopt the position that treaty obligations may be 
imported into New Zealand law only by statute. 
226 Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hore[, above n 206. 
227 Case of Proclamations, above n 222. 
228 For example, the adoption and publication of a Cabinet decision. 
229 "[O]ne must distinguish between the existence of the prerogative and the machinery set up to enable 
the expeditious and efficient use of that prerogative": R v Secretary of Srarefor the Home Deparrmem, ex 
p Northumbria Police Authority , above n 206, per Purchas U, 570. 
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4 Does judicial aurhority prevent incorporation by prerogarive? 
In Ashby v Minister of Immigrarion23 0 the Minister of Immigration's decision to issue 
temporary entry permits under section 14 of the Immigration Act 1964 to members of 
the Springbok rugby team who were due to tour New Zealand was challenged. Ashby 
claimed that the Minister's discretion to issue permits could be exercised only in 
conformity with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 1965231 . 
The Court of Appeal held that the Minister's discretion to grant or refuse a temporary 
permit was not expressly fettered in any way, and that the Convention could not override 
the Act; Cooke J also noted that: 232 
[i]f the Convention does have some wider scope, which is not clear, it has not as to any such 
wider scope been incorporated into New Zealand law by any Act of Parliament. It is elementary 
that international treaty obligations are not binding in domestic law until they have become 
incorporated in rhm way. 
The Court of Appeal found that the Racial Discrimination Convention had not been 
incorporated into domestic law by Parliament. It did not find that international treaties 
could not be incorporated into New Zealand law through the operation of the 
prerogative. The Court did find that international treaties could not be imported into 
domestic law judicially, and it refused to do this233 . The broad statement in the 
judgment of Cooke J that treaty obligations may be incorporated only by Act of 
Parliament should be seen in this light rather than as a prohibition on the importation of 
treaty obligations through the prerogative, a point not touched on in Ashby. 
It should also be noted that the statements on this point in the judgments of Richardson 
or Somers JJ are expressed in narrower and, it is submitted, more accurate terms. 
Richardson J said:234 
It is not suggested that the Convention, as such, is part of the law of New Zealand for it is well 
settled that the making of a treaty is an executive act while the performance of its obligations, if 
rhey entail alreration of rhe existi11g domestic law, requires legislative action. 
230 Above n 186. 
231 The argument put forward that the Convention was a relevant consideration which the Minister was 
bound to take into account in exercising his discretion is discussed in Part lII E below. 
232 Above, per Cooke J, 224, emphasis added. 
233 Above, per Cooke J, 226, II 30 - 35 and per Somers J, 232, 1 25. 
234 Above, 229 , citing Auomey-Ge11eral for Canada v Auomey-General for Ontario [ l 937] AC 326 as 
authority for this proposition and also refering to Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (3 ed, 
1979) 49. Emphasis added. 
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Somers J, while expressing substantial agreement with the reasons and conclusions of 
Cooke J, considered that "there may be room for debate as to how far international law 
is a part of New Zealand law ... "235 . It is unfortunate that the statement of principle of 
Cooke J rather than Richardson J has been subsequently adopted as a correct statement of 
the law in this area. 
Cooke J' s statement was quoted with approval by the Federal Court in Australia in Kioa 
v Minister of Immigration and Erhnic Ajfairs236 • The appellants, Tongan citizens with an 
Australian-citizen daughter, sought review of a decision to deport them from Australia. 
They argued237 that the decision-maker was obliged to take into account certain 
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child. In the Federal Court , Northrop and Wilcox JJ , citing the 
above-quoted extract from the judgment of Cooke J in Ashby , said that "[t]o make good 
their argument the appellants need to find a legislative adoption of the treaty 
provisions" 238 and concluded that the Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (Cth) did not 
provide such an adoption. 
In the High Court, only Gibbs CJ dealt with this point in any detail stating that it was 
"trite to say that treaties do not have the force of law unless they are given that effect by 
statute" 239 , citing Simsek with approval. However, the High Court found that the 
provisions of the Covenant and the Declaration had been complied with in any case by 
the immigration officer who made the decision to deport . Kioa does not take the 
question whether treaty obligations can be imported into domestic law through the 
exercise of the prerogative any further than Ashby, since this point was never raised nor 
commented on by the High Court. 
In Simsek v Minister of Immigrarion and Ethnic Ajfairs240 , Stephen J found that treaty 
obligations do not directly confer rights domestically, but he also went on to say: 24 1 
In my view [the] authorities are not confined to the case of treaties which seek to impose 
obligations upon individuals; they rest upon a broader proposition. The reason of the matter is to 
be found in the fact that in our constitutional system treaties are matters for the Exec.:ut1 ve, 
involving the exercise of prerogative power, whereas it is for Parliament , and not for the 
Executive , to make or alter municipal law .... 
235 Above, 232 . 
236 Kioa v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1984) 55 ALR 669 , 680. 
23 7 The main point for determination, whether the power to deport had to be exercised in accordance with 
the rules of natural justice, was decided in favour of the appellants. The treaty argument was a secondary 
argument. 
238 Above n 236. 
239 Kioa v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 62 ALR 321 , 336 . 
240 Above n 186. 
241 Above, 232. 
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This would seem to impose a blanket prohibition on the importation of treaties into 
domestic law through the exercise of the prerogative. However, it is submitted that 
Simsek is not persuasive on this point in New Zealand firstly because Stephen J does not 
deal with the point that the Crown clearly does retain a residual authority to legislate242 . 
Secondly, the principle expressed by Stephen J is much narrower than that found in other 
cases on the point, as the next section of the paper shows. Thirdly, Simsek conflicts 
directly with the later finding of Chilwell J (which, it is submitted, is correct in 
principle) that treaty obligations may be implemented in a non-statutory way. 
The statements in Ashby and Kioa that it is "elementary" 243 and "trite"244 that treaties 
may be incorporated into domestic law only by legislation express an unduly restrictive 
version of the rule relating to importation of treaty obligations into domestic law which 
is not supported by an examination of the early authorities on this question. The specific 
rules established by a series of English and Commonwealth decisions are set out below. 
(a) A treaty can not directly deprive a citizen of statutory or common law private 
rights or remedies 
The earliest case usually cited for the proposition that treaties may be imported into 
domestic law only by Parliamentary legislation is The Parlement Belge245 . The 
Attorney-General argued that although the treaty in that case had not been confirmed by 
statute, "it was competent for her Majesty ... to put its provisions into operation without 
the confirmation of them by Parliament" 246 . Sir Robert Phillimore rejected this 
argument, saying that:247 
[i]f the Crown had power without the authority of parliament by this treaty to order that the 
Parlement Beige should be entitled to all the privileges of a ship of war [then tJhis is a use of the 
treaty-making prerogative of the Crown which I believe to be without precedent, and in principle 
242 Bradley and Halsbury, above n 208; This point is also recognised by P Cane "Prerogative Acts, Acts 
of State and Justiciability" (1980) 29 ICLQ 680, 690: "[T]he ban on unparliamentary legislation is not 
uni versa!" . 
243 Above n 186, 224, per Cooke J. 
244 Above n 242, 336, per Gibbs J. 
245 ( 1879) 4 PD 129. The Parlement Beige, a Belgian packet owned by the Belgian King and carrying 
mail in British territorial waters, collided with a British ship, the Daring. The owners of the Daring filed 
proceedings in rem to recover redress. In the court of first instance, Sir Robert Phillimore found that the 
customary rule of international law which gave immunity from seizure to certain categories of public 
vessels such as ships of war did not extend to cover the Parlement Beige. However, under article 6 of a 
Convention entered into on 17 February 1876 between the Governments of Great Britain and Belgium, 
Belgian packets were "not [to] be diverted from their especial duty [of carrying rnail] ... by any authority 
whatever, or be liable to seizure, detention, embargo or arret de prince". 
246 Above. 
247 Above, 154 - 155. 
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contrary to the laws of the constitution .... [T]he remedy, in my opinion, is not to be found in 
depriving the British subject without his consent, direct or implied, of his right of action against a 
wrong-doer, but by the agency of diplomacy .... 
Sir Robert Phillimore' s decision was not that the Crown may not incorporate treaty 
obligations in a non-statutory way; it was that the Crown could not by treaty deprive a 
British subject of a right to claim damages in respect of harm done by a foreign person, 
even if that person were the sovereign of another state. He commented: 248 
Blackstone must have known very well that there were a class of treaties the provisions of which 
were inoperative without the confirmation of the legislature; while there were others which 
operated without such confirmation. The strongest instance of the latter, perhaps, ... is the 
Declaration of Paris in 1856, by which the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative deprived this 
country of belligerent rights, which very high authorities in the state and in the law had considered 
to be of vital importance to it. But this declaration did not affect the private rights of the subject; 
and the question before me is whether this treaty does affect private rights , and therefore required 
the sanction of the legislature. 
His j udgment therefore supports, rather than detracts from, the contention that the 
Crown may, in some circumstances, implement treaty obligations other than by Act of 
Parliament249 . As Elkind and Shaw point out: 250 
[i]t is regrettable that Phillimore treated the case as one of first impression since he thereby faded 
to expose fully the constitutional roots of the doctrine on which he relied . Apart from 
undoubtedly learned speculation about what Blackstone must have known, the case offers little 
authority for its ratio decidendi. 
A more recent decision on the same point, but where the exercise of the prerogative and 
the treaty also conflicted with statute law is Laker Airways lrd v Deparrmenr of Trade251 , 
in which the Court of Appeal granted a declaration that the Secretary of State could not 
exercise prerogative powers to cancel the licence granted to Mr Laker under statute to fly 
air services between London and New York. 
248 Above. 
249 Sir Robert Phillimore'sjudgment was overturned by the Court of Appeal ((1880) 5 PD 197) which 
found that it was a customary rule of international law, and therefore a part of the common law of 
England , that vessels such as the Parlement Beige were immune from seizure. The effect of the 
Convention was therefore not an issue. The Court of Appeal declined to answer the question "[w]hether, if 
the Court would otherwise have jurisdiction [to order that the ship could be seized], it was ousted by 
Article 6 of the Convention" and would neither "affirm nor deny" the finding of Sir Robert Phillimore on 
this point (204). 
250 Above n 210, 237. 
251 Above n 189. See also Walker v Baird above n 185, in which the British and French Governments 
agreed that no new lobster factories were to be established in Newfoundland without joint Bntish and 
French consent. When Baird established a lobster fishery it was seized by the local British naval 
commander. Baird sued for damages. The Crown conceded that it "could not maintain the proposition 
that [it] could sanction an invasion by its officers of the rights of private individuals whenever it was 
necessary in order to compel obedience to the provisions of a treaty"; nor did the Privy Council accept the 
Crown's argument that Walker's actions were justified as an "act of state" and that the court's jurisdiction 
was thereby ousted. 
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(b) Treaties do not directly confer private rights or liabilities 
The House of Lords recently restated the rule that international treaties cannot directly 
confer private rights or liabilities in the International Tin Council Appeals252 . The 
International Tin Council (ITC) was established by treaty (the Sixth International Tin 
Agreement) in 1956 to adjust world tin production and consumption and to prevent 
excessive price fluctuation. It went broke, owing several hundred million pounds to its 
creditors, who then commenced several actions seeking to make the states who were 
members of the Council liable for the amounts owing by the ITC, either directly or 
indirect! y. 
Lord Templeman rejected the appellant creditors' submissions that the ITC had a right of 
indemnity against the member states by virtue of the treaty: 253 
Those submissions, if accepted, would involve a breach of the British constitution and an invasion 
by the judiciary of the functions of the Government and of Parliament. The Government may 
negotiate, conclude, construe, observe, breach, repudiate or terminate a treaty. Parliament may 
alter the laws of the United Kingdom. The courts must enforce those laws; judges have no power 
to grant specific performance of a treaty or to award damages against a sovereign state for breach 
of a treaty or to invent laws or misconstrue legislation in order to enforce a treaty. 
A treaty is a contract between the governments of two or more sovereign states. International law 
regulates the relations between sovereign states and determines the validity, the interpretation and 
the enforcement of treaties. A treaty to which Her Majesty's Government is a party does not alter 
the laws of the United Kingdom. A treaty may be incorporated into and alter the laws of the 
United Kingdom by means of legislation. Except to the extent that a treaty becomes incorporated 
into the laws of the United Kingdom by statute, the courts of the United Kingdom have no power 
to enforce treaty rights and obligations at the behest of a sovereign government or at the behest of 
a private individual. 
Despite Lord Templeman' s unequivocating summary of the law, he never specifically 
addressed the question whether treaty rights could be incorporated through the exercise 
of prerogative powers other than through statute. Lord Templeman said, obviously 
correctly, that treaty provisions do not directly give rights to or take rights away from 
citizens or alter the common law or statutes of Commonwealth countries. However, he 
did not say that treaty rights may not be incorporated into municipal law through the 
exercise of Crown prerogative and there is no indication that this matter was argued. 
252 (1989) 3 WLR 969. An earlier authority is Jn re Californian Fis Syrup Company's Trade Mark(L889) 
LR 40 Ch D 620 (a company could not acquire a trade mark under an international treaty when it had 
failed to comply with a specific statutory procedure governing the acquisition of the right). See also 
Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [ l 979) Ch 344. 
253 Above n 255, 890. 
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(c) The provisions of an Act of Parliament prevail over inconsistent provisions in an 
international treaty 
It is clear that, where the provisions of a treaty are inconsistent with the provisions of an 
Act of Parliament, the statute prevails254 . In the absence of inconsistency, however, 
there is no impediment to the importation of treaty rights into domestic law through the 
exercise of Crown prerogative. 
(d) The use of treaties in statutory interpretation 
While treaties may not be directly imported into domestic law, they may be used to assist 
in statutory interpretation. In Ashby Richardson J said: 255 
[i]t has been increasingly recognised in recent years that , even though treaty ob ligations not 
implemented by legislation are not part of our domestic law, the Courts in interpreting leg1slat10n 
will do their best conformably with the subject-matter and the policy of the legislation to see that 
their decisions are consistent with our international obligations. 
The English courts have considered the importation of rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights256 in several cases which have addressed the scope of the 
rule of statutory interpretation that treaty law and domestic law should be read 
consistently with each other. Some cases257 approve a broad principle that the provisions 
of a treaty must be taken into account by domestic courts unless a domestic statute 
clearly conflicts with the treaty provisions. 
proposition. 
Other cases258 support a narrower 
254 Mortensen v Peters above n 212, 100; Col/co Dealings Ltd V !RC [ l 962] AC 1; [ 1961] l All ER 
762; Cheney v Conn, above n 212, 781; see also Bradley , 63. 
255 Above n 186, 229. See also Van Gorkom v Attorney-General (1977] l NZLR 535, 542 - 543 per 
Cooke J. 
25 6 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms l 950, 2 I 3 
Rome, 4 November 1950, UNTS 222. The European Convention on Human Rights was concluded under 
the auspices of the Council of Europe, a larger and quite different body to the European Economic 
Community (EEC). By virtue of s 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 (UK), which applies to the 
EEC, enforceable community rights take effect directly in English law and are enforceable in English 
courts. Different rules apply to the European Convention on Human Rights, however. There is no 
legislative provision which directly imports the contents of that convention into English law . See Halsbury 
vol 8 Foreign Relations Law para 1629 p 841 and vol 51 European Communities para 1.09 p 18. 
257 R v Secrewry of State for Home Affairs, exp Bhajan Singh (1976) QB 198 (CA); R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, exp Phansopka [ 1976) QB 606; (1975] 3 All ER 497 (CA): "[I]t is now 
the duty of our public authorities in administering the law, including the Immigration Act 1971, and of our 
courts in interpreting and applying the law, including the Act, to have regard" to the European Convent10n 
on Human Rights: per Scarman U, 511, cited to All ER. See also Ahmad v Inner London Educmion 
Authority [1978J QB 36; Garland v British Rail Engineering Case 12/81 [1983] 2 AC 751 (HL). 
258 R v Chief Immigration Officer, exp Salamm Bibi [ l 976] 3 All ER 843 (CA); 
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For example in Brind v Secrerary of State for the Home Department259 the principle that 
the courts must have regard to the principles of international conventions in construing 
domestic legislation was reduced to a "mere canon of construction which involves no 
importation of international law into the domestic field "260 , to be resorted to only in the 
case of ambiguity in domestic legislation. The New Zealand cases support the broader 
principle that the requirement for consistency between domestic and international law is a 
general rule of interpretation, which applies except where the domestic statute is capable 
of bearing only one meaning, and that meaning is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
international treaty. 
(e) Summary of the authorities 
It is submitted that there is nothing in the authorities which is directly inconsistent with 
the proposition that treaty obligations may be imported into domestic law through the 
exercise of prerogative powers. The earlier authorities confine the prohibition on the 
direct importation of treaty rights and obligations to situations where private rights would 
be affected, or where there is a conflict between the provisions of a treaty and a domestic 
statute, or both261 . These earlier authorities do not support broader statements of 
principle that treaty obligations may be imported into domestic law only by 
Parliamentary legislation. Those statements are better taken as authority for a 
prohibition on direct judicial importation of treaty obligations, rather than a prohibition 
on indirect importation by "prerogative legislation". 
Stephen J, in Simsek262 , extended the prohibition to importation by executive action and 
identified the area of constitutional principle which was relevant, but, it is submitted with 
respect, got it wrong because he failed to take into account the Crown's residual power 
to "legislate". It is therefore submitted that the statement of the law contained in 
BenipaI'-63 is correct. 
259 [ 1991) l All ER 720 (HL). 
260 Above, per Lord Bridge, 723. 
261 See, for example, Attorney-General for Canada v Arrorney-General for Omario [ l 937) AC 326 (PC) 
where Lord Atkin said, 347: "Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of 
a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing 
domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly 
ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law. If the national 
executive, the government of the day, decide to incur the obligations of a treaty which involve alteration of 
law they have to run the risk of obtaining the assent of Parliament to the necessary statute or statutes". 
Emphasis added. 
262 Above n 186. 
263 Above n 21, 264. See Part III B2 above. 
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5 Can the Refugee Convention be imported into domestic law through the exercise 
of Crown prerogative? 
There is no set form for "prerogative legislation"264 . The Crown has imported the 
Refugee Convention into domestic law by Cabinet decision265 . This is sufficient to meet 
the definition of "prerogative legislation" used in this paper (the making of new Jaw by 
the Crown by formal decision or declaration)266 . 
The validity of the thesis that the Refugee Convention 1s now part of domestic law 
through the exercise of Crown prerogative depends on whether the method of 
transformation and the provisions of the Refugee Convention are compatible with the 
principles and rules of constitutional law relating to the exercise of the prerogative and to 
the relationship between domestic and international law. The provisions of the Refugee 
Convention are tested below against these principles. 
The first principle, that the prerogative may be exercised only in an area where 
prerogative powers exist, is met by the provisions of the Refugee Convention. The 
Convention deals with the status of refugees and their right not to be sent back to a place 
where they may be persecuted. This is essentially a matter to do with the prerogative 
power to restrain aliens from entering the country. In setting up an internal section 
within the New Zealand Immigration Service of the Department of Labour and in setting 
up the Refugee Status Appeals Authority, the Crown has "legislated" pursuant to its 
prerogative power regarding aliens and has not sought to extend this power267 . The 
implementation of the Convention is a matter which falls within the "pure and strict" 
category of prerogative powers. 
264 Halsbury, above n 211. 
265 By establishing ICOR in 1978 (see Part II); by establishing the RSS and the RSAA (then called the 
Refugee Status Appeals Committee (RSAC)) in 1990 (CAB (90) M 46 /22); and by establishing new Terms 
of Reference for the RSAA in 1991 (CAB (91) M 9/ 14 and the decision of the Minister of lmrrugration 
made on 18 March 1992; see above n 106). All these decisions charged the decision-makers with the 
responsibility of determining whether refugee applicants are refugees as defined in the 1951 Convention. 
In setting up ICOR, the Government acted with the intention of fulfilling its international obligations under 
the Convention: Benipal, above n 21, 235 - 237; in sending an outline of these procedures to UNHCR, 
the Government was officially representing that New Zealand's domestic law complied with the 
Convention: above, 243. It is submitted that the adoption of the Convention is complete if its contents are , 
by virtue of statute or prerogative action, provided for in New Zealand law, without verbatim adoption of 
the provisions of the Convention. 
266 In Silke Ali v Minister of Immigration , above n 119, Barker J noted, 7, that the RSAA had been 
"solemnly ... established by Government decree". It is submitted that this is an alternative definition of 
"prerogative legislation". 
267 Bradley, 249 - 250 and 417 . 
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The second principle, that the prerogative may be used as the source of authority for an 
action only if there is no statute which covers the area, is also met in the case of the 
Refugee Convention. It is true that the Immigration Act covers almost every aspect of 
the process by which aliens generally enter, stay and are removed from or leave New 
Zealand268 . However, the Act does not deal with the entry, presence or removal of 
refugees269 as a specific, distinct and legally defined class of aliens. The principle 
confirmed in de Keyser270 and Laker271 , that where Parliament does not expressly reserve 
prerogative powers to itself when legislating in an area where the prerogative operates, 
the statute supersedes the prerogative for the time being, is therefore no impediment to 
the thesis. In Chandra and Lucas v Coleman, it was accepted that a residual area of 
prerogative power still exists in the immigration area, notwithstanding the existence of 
legislation. 
The rule of statutory interpretation that a Court will interpret legislation "in conformity 
with New Zealand treaty obligations for it is to be assumed that Parliament legislates in 
accordance with its international obligations" 272 subject to the clear wording of the 
statute173 , is met in this case. There is no conflict between the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention and the provisions of the Immigration Act or settled common law. The 
Convention requires that refugee applicants must have their status determined by 
contracting parties and that refugees may not be refoule. The Immigration Act sets out 
the conditions under which aliens may enter, remain in, and be removed from New 
Zealand. There is nothing in the Immigration Act which authorises or compels the 
refoulemem of refugees or which is inconsistent with mandatory access to a fair refugee 
status determination procedure. 
Indeed the Act is almost silent on the subject of refugees. Since the Minister has 
established a firm non-statutory procedure for refugee determination, it is to be assumed 
that it was intended that this special area of immigration law was to be dealt with as 
additional to the statutory provisions, not in conflict with them. The arrival of 
spontaneous refugee applicants is a new problem for the government to deal with274 . 
Parliament had the opportunity to deal with this new problem by way of legislation m 
268 Chandra v Minister of lmmigratio11, above n 197. 
269 Except in section 18(6)(a) which refers to refugee travel documents issued under the Refugee 
Convention, as defined in section 2(1). 
270 Above n 206. 
271 Above n 189. 
272 NZ Commentary above nl86, Binder F, Chapter 149, Statutes, para C 870, p 28 citing Van Gorkom v 
Attorney-General [1977] 1 NZLR 543 per Cooke J (affd [1978] 2 NZLR 387) and Levave v Immigration 
Departme11t [1979] 2 NZLR 74, per Somers J at 79 . See also Ashby, above n 
273 Above. See also the discussion of Brind, Part III E3. 
274 See Part l B above regarding the causes of the problem. 
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1987 and in 1991 and chose not to do so. Therefore there can be no suggestion that the 
Crown is attempting to do by prerogative what it already has power to do under existing 
legislation. The Immigration Act and the refugee determination procedures are 
complementary; the Convention does not conflict with the legislation. 
Support for this view may be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal in D v 
Minister of Immigration275 • Cooke P, delivering the judgment of the Court, said:
276 
As to [the] argument about the purpose of s 128, the section is certainly being used here for 'turn 
around' purposes and we see no reason why, while a person unlawfully in New Zealand is 
detained under the section, investigation of questions of refugee status, which might lead to a 
permit, should not be undertaken. 
Support for this position is also found in the submission made in Benipal on behalf of the 
Ministers that "the decision to grant or refuse refugee status is wholly distinct and 
separate from the exercise of powers under the Immigration Act"
277 . Chilwell J's 
finding that the Ministers were exercising statutory powers of decision, since the 
granting of refugee status and the granting of a permit were "inseparable"
278 accepts that 
there are two separate processes, and supports the proposition that the refugee 
determination procedures and the provisions of the Act are complementary
279 . 
The requirement for legislation is obviously a sensible one where commercial treaties are 
being considered. However, the Refugee Convention deals with an area of law which is 
concerned with the recognition of a particular status held by people, not with the taking 
away of rights already accrued under statute or at common law. There are good reasons 
not to draw a distinction between the granting and the taking away of rights in the 
commercial area, because the conferring of property rights by treaty could lead to a great 
deal of confusion in the commercial world. 
However, different considerations apply with respect to international human rights 
conventions which establish "human rights" rather than "private rights". The 
275 Above n 152. 
276 Above, 675. Indeed in that case, the Court of Appeal noted that the immigration officials were 
prepared to classify the applicants as refugees under the provisional Gulf War procedures; the problem for 
the applicants was that the police would not give them a security clearance. Jud1c1al authority therefore 
establishes that the Act and the procedures established under the prerogative are separate but compatible 
provisions. Article 33(2) of the Convention specifically contemplates the return of refugees where security 
is an issue. 
277 Above n 21, 244. These views were expressed as part of the Crown's submission that the Minister 
was not exercising a "statutory power of decision" and that his decision was therefore unreviewable. 
278 Above, 247. 
279 Compare Laker, in which the legislation did cover the field, directly and comprehensively. Lord 
Roskill said (206) that "the prerogative power and the power under the municipal law [could not] march 
side by side each operating in its own field". 
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importation of requirements in the human rights area is unlikely to affect the existing 
statutory or common law rights of citizens and which, in New Zealand, could not 
drastically alter domestic law in any case280 . 
Thirdly, the exercise of the prerogative in this case does not affect the private rights of 
New Zealand citizens as established by statute or finally-determined common law. The 
granting of refugee status to aliens has nothing to do with the existing private rights of 
New Zealand citizens. 
Finally, the rule that treaties do not directly confer rights on citizens is not relevant when 
considering the Refugee Convention. A refugee seeking enforcement of the obligations 
imposed on the Government to determine an application for refugee status and not to 
return the refugee to persecution in the country of origin is seeking to enforce domesiic 
righrs established by "prerogative legislation". The Refugee Convention is now part of 
New Zealand law. 
It is submitted that in any case the "private rights" principle is not contravened because 
of the nature of international treaties which deal with human rights . Internationally 
recognised human rights are not "private rights" in the sense in which that term is used 
in cases like The Parlemem Beige but are "public rights" 281 . Nevertheless, they are 
legally recognised rights and it is the central function of the courts to protect the legal 
rights of individuals282 . Where international instruments seek to do this, if no alteration 
of domestic statute law or common law is required, and the existing private rights of 
citizens are not affected, the courts should seek to give effect to such instruments in their 
decisions283 . A distinction between the granring of rights or benefits by prerogative 
power and the violarion of individual rights by prerogative power has also been judicially 
recognised284 . 
280 One hopes. In many of the cases in which the argument that international treaties should be judicially 
noti ced has been rejected by a domestic court, the court has also found that the provisions of the treaty 
were not infringed by the domestic decision-maker in any case. This is true of Simsekv Mi11ister of 
!111migratio11 a,ul Eth11ic Affairs ( 1982) 40 ALR 61 (HCA); Kioa v Mi11ister of lmmigratio11 and Ethnic 
Affairs above n 242; Bri,ui above n 262; R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, exp Bhajan Singh above 
n 260; leuluai and Leuluai v Minister of Immigration below n 332; Vaematahau v Maxwell below n 331. 
28 1 See above Part IIIC4(a)(ii). 
282 Cane, above n 245, 697 . 
283 This point is made by Elkind and Shaw, above n 210, 243 - 244. 
284 R v Secretary of State for the Home Depanment, exp Northumbria Police Authority above n 206: "It 
is well established that the courts will intervene to prevent executive action under prerogative powers in 
violation of property or other rights of the individual where this is inconsistent with statutory provisions 
providing for the same executive action. Where the executive action is directed towards the benefit or 
protection of the individual, it is unlikely that its use will attract the intervention of the courts .. . ", 571 
per Purchas Li . The granting of refugee status is in any case technically a privilege and not a right, in the 
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6 Implications of the thesis that treaty rights may be imported into domestic 
law through the exercise of Crown prerogative 
It is submitted that through the exercise of the prerogative the Refugee Convention has 
been transformed into municipal law in New Zealand. What are the implications of this 
transformation for the Crown, for refugees and for the constitution? For refugees, the 
transformation of the Convention into domestic law gives refugees the ability to directly 
enforce the provisions of the Convention in the courts in New Zealand. This is 
important, because refugees have no effective remedy at international law285 . 
The adoption of the Refugee Convention as domestic law means that the discretionary 
powers of decision contained in the Immigration Act relating to detention and turnaround 
of those who arrive in an irregular manner apply according to their tenor only to "illegal 
immigrants". This is a different class of aliens to refugees. If an arrival claims refugee 
status, that person may not be detained and "turned around" under section 128. A 
refugee applicant must be given the opportunity to have her claim to refugee status 
determined fairly. 
Nor may a person who arnves "lawfully" and subsequently claims refugee status be 
removed under Part II of the Act without having her claim determined. If refugee status 
is recognised, the refugee may not be returned to persecution. A person detained under 
section l28B of the Act also has the right of access to the determination procedure, 
although if she is judged to be a danger to the security of New Zealand, she may be 
subject to refou/ement according to article 33 (2) of the Convention. 
For the Crown, the implications are uncertain. The exercise of the power of the Crown 
to legislate in this area has broader constitutional implications. The concern that 
prerogative powers should not be extended, and that the Crown may not govern through 
the exercise of prerogative powers except where that prerogative power has existed since 
1688 still has relevance, although the possibility of abuse is sourced not in the authority 
of the sovereign but in the institution of Cabinet286 . 
While the adoption of treaty prov1s10ns through the exercise of prerogative powers is 
legally possible, that does not make it constitutionally desirable. Nevertheless, the 
likelihood that other treaties will satisfy the very narrow criteria under which treaty 
same way that the compensation granted in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board exp lain above n 
209 , was technically an ex gratia payment and not a right (Wade, above n I 85, 242) 
285 Part I D2 above. 
286 Fitzgerald v Muldoon, above n 224; see also Bradley, 53 - 55. 
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obligations may be incorporated into municipal law by exercise of the prerogative is 
small. Commercial treaties will almost always affect private rights. The sorts of treaties 
which would satisfy the criteria applicable are those which deal with human rights rather 
than property rights; the effect on New Zealand citizens is therefore likely to be 
beneficial rather than detrimental287 . The requirement for formal adoption and 
publication of "prerogative legislation" also provides some minimal accountability. It is 
submitted that the adoption of treaty provisions by "policy decisions", as proposed by 
Elkind and Shaw288 , does not provide for sufficient accountability by the executive. 
The second implication arises from the nature of prerogative legislation. If the Crown 
may legislate by virtue of the prerogative (in a very limited area), then it may legislate to 
incorporate the provisions of a treaty. However, although "prerogative legislation" is 
legislation, it is subject to somewhat different rules to Parliamentary legislation. As the 
Case of Proclamarions289 established, "prerogative legislation" is subject to control by 
the courts (provided it is done in an area which is justiciable) in a way which Acts of 
Parliament are not. 
In incorporating the prov1s1ons of the Convention by exercising the prerogative, the 
Crown may in fact have less flexibility to act than it would have if legislation had been 
passed. The standards of behaviour imposed by the courts may be somewhat higher than 
the standards which Parliament would have inserted into an Act of Parliament, had it 
chosen to legislate in this area. Certainly the decisions of the Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority indicate that the requirements of the Convention will be strictly enforced by 
that body, and attempts to cut down the effect of those requirements through 
administrative action290 have been decisively rejected by the Authority. 
The third implication is that, if the courts can control "prerogative legislation" m this 
way, the principles espoused by the courts on the Refugee Convention and the 
procedures set up to implement it then become part of the common law of New Zealand. 
Since "prerogative legislation" is subject to the control of the courts, it is arguable that 
subsequently these judicial decisions may not be able to be overridden by a further use of 
the prerogative attempting to "de-adopt" the provisions of a treaty. The effect of this 
judicial recognition of domestic enforcement of international treaties through the exercise 
of the prerogative would be similar to the effect of stare decisis on rules of customary 
287 See Elkind and Shaw, above n 210, 243. 
288 Above, 235, 240. This is recognised at 243. 
289 Above n 222. 
290 See Part II A2(d) above. 
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international law291 . Since the Crown cannot make common law, it could be argued that 
the judicial decisions recognising the Convention as part of municipal law could be 
altered only by Act of Parliament. 
This means that while the detail of the refugee determination procedures could be 
changed, any alteration could not derogate from the requirement that a fair refugee status 
determination procedure must be in existence, and that refugees may not be returned or 
refoule to a place where they may face persecution. 
C Incorporation of rhe Cusromary Rule of Non-Refoulement into New Zealand law 
The second way in which the Refugee Convention has been incorporated into New 
Zealand's domestic law is through the operation of customary international law. 
Customary rules of international law: 292 
are considered to be part of the law of the land and enforced as such, with the qualifi cation that 
they are incorporated only so far as is not inconsistent with Acts of Parliament or prior jud1l: ial 
decisions of final authority. 
Non-refoulement is a customary rule of international law293 and as such 1s incorporated 
into and forms part of the law of New Zealand294. 
For the purposes of this paper, the extent of the obligation of non-refoulemem as a 
customary rule of international law is considered to be co-extensive with the provisions 
of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Although earlier in this paper the obligation of 
non-refou!ement and the requirement to establish a determination procedure are treated as 
separate obligations, the second requirement really flows from the first. Before a 
decision can be made about whether to return a person claiming refugee status, one needs 
to determine if that person is a Convention refugee. The customary rule of international 
law prohibiting refoulement therefore includes the requirement to establish a 
determination procedure295. 
291 Brownlie Public International Law 44. On the point whether obsolete rules of international law are 
binding, see Trendtex Trading Corporation v Cemral Bank of Nigeria [ 1977 J I QB 529; [ 19771 I All ER 
881 per Lord Denning MR cited to All ER 889 - 890. 
292 Brownlie Public International Law 43. 
293 See J F Hartman "The Principle and Practice of Temporary Refuge: A Customary Norm Protecting 
Civilians Fleeing Internal Armed Conflict" in Martin Asylum Seekers, 87 and the discussion in Part 1 above 
regarding the extent of the obligation. 
294 Halsbury, vol 18 para 1403. 
295 The good administration of justice is also a general principle of international law. This requires that 
decisions be made fairly and in accordance with natural justice in any case: Plender Asylum 83. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VlCTORIA UNIVERSITY CF '.vELLH·JGTON 
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Brownlie notes296 that the cases decided since 1876 are interpreted by some authorities in 
such a way as to displace the doctrine of (direct) incorporation of customary international 
law by that of (indirect) transformation. The doctrine of transformation holds that 
customary international law is part of domestic law only if the rules have been clearly 
adopted and made part of the law of England by legislation, judicial decision, or 
established usage. Brownlie concludes that "[t]he authorities, taken as a whole, support 
the doctrine of incorporation, and the least favourable dicta are equivocal to say the 
least" 297 . In the absence of any authority to the contrary, it is submitted that the doctrine 
of incorporation correctly represents the law of New Zealand. 
In order to be recognised as a customary rule of international law, a legal principle must 
be reflected in general, uniform and consistent state practice of sufficient duration and 
must be adhered to by states out of a sense that the practice is legally obligatory (opinio 
juris)198 . The weight of authority is now in favour of the proposition299 . 
Stenberg, for example, finds300 that states which are not parties to the Convention 
nevertheless do not generally consider that they have a right to refoule refugees; that 
virtually no states have formally opposed General Assembly resolutions on the subject; 
and that attempts to deny entry to refugees are normally justified on the basis that the 
people concerned are illegal immigrants, not refugees, or are a security risk. On this 
basis, and following an examination of state practice, he concludes that "there is ample 
evidence for the contention that the principle of non-refoulement has become a general 
rule of customary international law" 301 . 
Plender notes that while "the principle of non-refoulement has been placed under some 
strain and efforts have been made on the part of several States to diminish its effect, [t]he 
latter serve, however, to underscore the growing, if reluctant, practice of acknowledging 
296 Public Jmemational Law, 43. 
297 Above, 47. Halsbury (above n 297) appears to have retreated from the position that customary rules 
must be adopted and now poses both (direct) incorporation and (indirect) transformation as arguable. 
298 Norrh Sea Co111i11e11tal Shelf Cases ICJ 1969 1. For a recent discussion of these requirements, see I R 
Gunning "Modernising Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights" (1991) 26 Ya J 
Int'l L 211. 
299 Among those who consider that the obligation is a rule of customary international law are D W Greig 
"The Protection of Refugees and Customary International Law" 8 Aust! YB lnt'I L 108, 132, 135, 141 
(1983); D Perluss and J F Hartman "Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm" (1986) 26 Ya 
J Int'l L 551; D A Martin "Large Scale Migrations of Asylum Seekers" 76 Am J 1nt'l L 598, 599 (1982). 
Greig states (132) "[s]ince [1969] the crucial issue is not so much as to the existence of the principle but as 
to its scope". A Grahl-Madsen Territorial Asylum (1980) 42 considered that the obligation of non-
refoulement was not a rule of customary international law. See also B S Tsamenyi "The Position of Non-
Parties to the Refugee Convention" [1981) Melanesian U 57. 
300 G Stenberg Non-Expulsion and No11-Refouleme11t ( 1989) 176 - 178. 
301 Above 279. 
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the existence of the principle as a binding obligation "302 . The UNHCR Executive 
Committee in 1982 reaffirmed that the principle was "progressively acquiring the 
character of a peremptory rule of international law" 303 . According to Plender, the fact 
that UNHCR could make this "somewhat audacious" assertion "lends credence and 
weight to the argument that the principle of non-refoulement has matured into a rule of 
customary law, at least"304 • 
Domestic law will be interpreted consistently with customary rules of international law, 
unless the clear wording of a statute or binding judicial decision is inconsistent with the 
customary rule:305 
On any judicial issue [the courts] seek to ascertain what the relevant rule [of general international 
law] is, and, having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is 
not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally declared by their tnbunals. 
It has been established in Part IIIC above that the provisions of the Refugee Convention, 
including the duty of non-refoulement, are consistent with the Immigration Act and that 
there is no finally-determined common law which conflicts with the Convention. This 
being the case, there is no impediment to the incorporation into domestic law of the 
customary rule of international law that states have a duty of non-refoulemenr towards 
refugees. 
D The Convenrion as a Mandawry Relevant Considerarion in Immigrarion 
Decision-Making 
In Ashby, Cooke and Somers JI left open the possibility306 that in a particular case, an 
international convention may be of such overwhelming importance that it would have to 
be taken into account when a decision-maker exercised the power to make a decision. It 
is submitted that the Refugee Convention is a relevant consideration which the Minister 
or the NZIS must take into account in making decisions under the Immigration Act 
302 R Plender International Migration law (2 ed, 1988) 430. 
303 Report on the Thiry-Third Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, 21 October 1982, UN Doc A/AC .96/614, para 70(l)(b), p 18. 
304 Above. Goodwin-Gill ("Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum-Seekers" (1986) Va J lnt'l L 898, 
902) contends that the principle of 11011-refoulement extends not only to Convention refugees, but also to all 
displaced persons who do not enjoy the protection of their country of origin. This controversial assertion 
has not gained universal acceptance and has been challenged vigorously by Hailbronner, who concedes 
only that the customary rule "may protect a limited class of refugees who would be subject to torture upon 
return to their home countries": "Non-Refoulement and Humamtanan Refugees: Customary International 
Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?" (1986) Va J lnt'l L 858. 
305 Chung Chi Cheung v The King [ 1939 I AC 160 per Lord Atkin at 167 - 168. 
306 Above n 186, 226 and 234. 
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where a question of refugee status arises, except where a question of security 1s 
concerned. Effectively, this makes the Convention part of New Zealand's domestic law. 
This section begins by confirming that immigration is a justiciable area and that the 
discretionary powers exercised in the immigration area are reviewable, then looks at the 
problems posed for this part of the thesis by the House of Lords' decision in Brind v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department307 , and finally summarises the reasons why 
the Refugee Convention is a mandatory relevant consideration in immigration decision-
making. 
1 Immigration is a justiciable area 
Immigration is a justiciable area. Nevertheless, the courts have been slow to intervene in 
this area which is allied to matters of foreign policy308 . The comments of Richardson J 
on this point in Ashby309 are still "very relevant" :310 
Immigration policy is a sensitive and often controversial political issue .... The absence of any 
part1cularisation is some indication that the legislature regarded the determination of the national 
interest in the exercise of the discretion a matter for decision in the round by the executive. 
However, unlike the area of security, where the courts will never intervene311 , there are 
circumstances in which the courts will review executive and administrative action in the 
immigration area312 . The "national interest" aspect of immigration policy may in some 
circumstances be offset or outweighed by the seriousness of the consequences of 
immigration decisions on people's lives. 
In Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department313 , the House of Lords 
quashed an order by the Secretary of State that a Ugandan citizen be returned to Kenya, 
where he had been living, on the basis that it could not be shown that Kenya would 
respect the non-refoulement provisions of the Convention, even though Kenya was a 
3o7 Above n 262. 
308 Taylor Judicial Review, para 1.37 p 26. 
309 Above n 186, 230 and 23 l. 
310 Behari v Minister of Immigration [ 1990) 3 NZLR 558 (CA). 
311 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985) AC 374 (HL); [1984) 3 All 
ER 935 cited to All ER; D v Minister of Immigration above n 152; R v Home Secretary, exp Hosenball 
[1977) l WLR 766. 
312 See Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration[ 1980) 2 NZLR 130; Chandra v Minister of Immigration, 
above n 197; see also Wade, 577 - 579. 
313 [1987) AC 514; [1987] 1 All ER 940. 
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party to the Convention. In that case, the Immigration Rules314 directly imported the 
terms of the Refugee Convention, making it an obligatory relevant consideration. 
There was clear evidence that if the appellant was removed to Kenya, the Kenyan 
authorities may well remove him to Uganda where he feared persecution315 . Lord 
Bridge made the following general observations: 31 6 
Within . . . [the limitations on the scope of the court's power to review] the court must, I think, 
be entitled to subject an administrative decision to the more rigorous examination, to ensure that it 
is in no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the decision determines. The 
most fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to life and, when an administrative 
decision under challenge is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk, the basis of 
the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny. 
The courts will scrutinise immigration decisions to ensure that they are made fairly 317 . 
Given the nature of the subject matter, however, the courts are more likely to intervene 
where the grounds for review are illegality or procedural unfairness rather than 
unreasonableness since too close a study of unreasonableness can lead into a discussion 
of the merits of the case, which is not a function of the courts318 . However where the 
consequences of a decision could be a threat to the applicant's life or freedom, the courts 
may be prepared to find that a decision is unreasonable319 . 
2 Discretionary powers are reviewable 
Under the Immigration Act 1987320 , the Minister's power to grant a temporary permit 
under section 9 (or a residence permit under section 8) is a matter of discretion. The 
power to grant a permit under the Immigration Act is a statutory power of decision32 1 
reviewable under section 4 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The Immigration 
Act states clearly that the power is a discretionary power. The powers under sections 
3 14 The Immigration Rules are rules of practice made by the Home Secretary under the Immigration Act 
1971 . They contain administrative instructions and statements of policy and practice. Their legal effect 1s 
somewhat uncertain: Wade, 225 - 226 and 858 - 859 . The relevant rules in Bugdaycay were section I, 
paragraph 16 which provided that "[n]othing in these rules is to be construed as requiring action contrary 
to the United Kingdom's obligations under [the Refugee Convention and Protocol]" and paragraph 73 
which stated: "Leave to enter will not be refused if removal would be contrary to the provisions of the 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees": above 944. 
31 5 Above, per Lord Bridge, 953 . 
3 l6 Above, foreshadowing his remarks in Brind, above n 262. 
317 See the authorities cited at n 315; see also Mohu v Attorney-General (1983] 4 NZAR; and the NZIS 
Manual Chapter 3. 
318 Kumar v Minister of Immigration (1991] NZAR 555 (HC), 559, per Anderson J. 
3l9 The dictum of Lord Bridge in Brind above n 262, 723 adopts this reasoning. 
320 Previous legislation gave the Minister similar discretion. 
321 As defined ins 3 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, and see Chandra, above n 197. 
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128 - 128B of the Act are also discretionary, as are the removal powers contained in Part 
II of the Act. 
Control over a discretionary administrative power may be exercised by judicial review 
on grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety322 . No discretionary 
power is unfettered (although the subject matter of the decision may be injusticiable): 323 
Although the Crown's lawyers have argued in numerous cases that unrestricted permissive 
language confers unfettered discretion, the truth is that, in a system based on the rule of law, 
unfettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms. The real question is whether the 
discretion is wide or narrow, and where the legal line is to be drawn. For this purpose everything 
depends on the true intent and meaning of the empowering Act. 
3 The problem of Brind 
In R v Secrerary of Stare for the Home Department, exp Bhajan Singh314 , Lord Denning 
recognised325 that international conventions could be mandatory relevant considerations 
in the immigration area. But he later retreated from this position. In R v Chief 
Immigration Officer, exp Salama! Bibi326 , he said: 
I desire, however, to amend one of the statements I made in [Singh]. I said then that the 
immigration officers ought to bear in mind the principles stated in the convention . I think that 
would be asking too much of the immigration officers ... [I]t is much better for us to stick to our 
own statutes and principles, and only look to the convention for guidance in case of doubt. 
The argument that the European Convention on Human Rights is a mandatory relevant 
consideration in decision-making in England was recently rejected in Brind v Secretary 
of State for the Home Deparrmenr 327 In that case, the Home Secretary exercised 
statutory and contractual powers to direct the BBC and the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (IBC) to refrain from broadcasting the direct statements of certain proscribed 
organisations in Northern Ireland. Brind and several other journalists applied for review 
of the Home Secretary's decision on several grounds, including the ground that he had 
acted in breach of the right to freedom of expression recognised by article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
322 CCSU above n 314. 
323 Wade, above n 185, 399. 
324 Above n 260. 
325 Above, 1083. In relation to the European Convention on Human Rights, he said that "immigration 
officers and the Secretary of State in exercising their duties ought to bear in mind the principles stated in 
the convention. They ought ... to have regard to the principles in it - because, after all, the principles 
stated in the convention are only a statement of the principles of fair dealing; and it is their duty to act 
fairly". 
326 Above n 261. 
327 Above n 262. 
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The appellants put forward an unsuccessful argument328 that: 
when a statute confers upon an administrative authority a discretion capable of being exercised in a 
way which infringes [a convention right], it may similarly be presumed that the legislative 
intention was that the discretion should be exercised within the limitations which the convention 
imposes. 
Lord Bridge said329 that this went beyond the resolution of an ambiguity; not only would 
this principle require that administrative decisions should be exercised in conformity with 
the convention, it would also require the courts to "[import] into domestic administrative 
law ... the text of the conv.ention and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights". Lord Ackner said330 that if the submission that the convention was a mandatory 
relevant consideration was accepted 
this inevitably would result in incorporating the convention into English domestic law by the back 
door. It would oblige the courts to police the operation of the rnnvention and to ask itsdf in each 
case, where there was a challenge, whether the restrictions were 'necessary m a democratic 
society' .... 
The argument that the Minister of Immigration was obliged to take into account the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was rejected by the High 
Court in New Zealand in Vaemarahau v Maxwell 331 and in Leuluai and Leuluai v 
Minister of Jmmigration332 . In Leuluai, Savage J said simply that333 "I doubt if enforcing 
the removal warrant would be in breach of the International Covenant, but in any event it 
had no application". It is obvious from both these judgments that the issue was not 
argued in any detail334 . For that reason, it is not considered that they would preclude a 
finding that the Refugee Convention is a mandatory relevant consideration if this 
submission were put forward in a comprehensive way. 
328 Above 723. 
329 Above. 
330 Above, 735. Lord Ackner does not explain why this task, which is undertaken by courts m the United 
States, Canada, Germany and many other countries in the world, is beyond the ab1ht1es of the English 
courts. 
331 Unreported, l September 1992, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 834/91, Jaine J. 
332 Unreported, 29 June 199 I, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 392/9 I, Savage J . 
333 Above, 9. 
334 The argument that ICCPR and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child were mandatory relevant 
considerations in immigration decision-making was rejected in Kioa (above n 242). Kioa is not persuasive 
on the point, however, because the Australian High Court found that the provisions of the Convention and 
Declaration had not been breached in any case and because the relevant statute provided only that it was 
"desirable that the laws of the Commonwealth and the conduct of persons administering those laws should 
conform with" the Conventions. Brennan J considered that the statute therefore clear! y stated that the 
conventions were permissible considerations. To hold that the Conventions were mandatory considerations 
would therefore have been in conflict with the domestic law, which must prevail in the event of 
inconsistency. The Conventions in that case were also more general than the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention. 
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The Brin.d decision is more of an obstacle, although a persuasive and not a binding 
obstacle. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it is not an insurmountable obstacle since its 
effect is limited to the European Convention on Human Rights for the reasons set out 
below. 
(a) The relationship of the United Kingdom to Europe has altered the doctrine of the 
legislative supremacy of Parliament in England to an indeterminate extent. That doctrine 
is now a relative doctrine. English law and the law of New Zealand are to that extent 
different. It is submitted that because of the complexity of the English situation335 and 
because the law in this area is still developing, English decisions on matters of 
constitutional law should now be examined carefully before an automatic assumption 1s 
made that they are applicable to the law of New Zealand. 
(b) The European Convention on Human Rights is a different sort of treaty to the 
Refugee Convention. The European Convention accords very general human rights to 
people. It covers a huge area of decision-making. It would be impossible, without a 
fundamental change in the way the English and New Zealand decision-makers and courts 
view fundamental human rights, for all those who make decisions to give practical 
meaning to provisions in such general instruments336 . 
The Refugee Convention, on the other hand, contains specific provisions relating to the 
rights of refugees and the duties of contracting states. These provisions are not 
aspirational, as are the provisions of the International Bill of Rights337 . They are directly 
applied by states parties to actual refugee situations. The Refugee Convention was 
designed as a practical solution to the refugee problem as it existed in Europe after the 
Second Worid War338 . Only those decision-makers in one area, immigration, have to 
take the Refugee Convention into account, and the concepts in the Refugee Convention 
are not theoretical or difficult to apply, but are practical and specific. 
335 Above n 259. 
336 In Salamat Bibi(above n 261) GeoffreyLane U said (850) : "One only has to read the article in 
question, art 8(2), to realise that it would be an impossibility for any immigration officer to apply a 
discretion based on terms as wide and as vague as those ... ". The article in that case provided that 
"[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of others". 
337 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights The Human Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons: 
Protections Afforded Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons under lntemational Human Rights, 
Humanitarian and Refugee law (1991), 12 and 13. 
338 Part I B above, although it has since been extended to have continuing and global coverage. 
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(c) The European Convention on Human Rights, while it contains broadly drafted 
rights, is nevertheless one of the most widely used human rights conventions339 . It also 
has an established and well-used complaints procedure which is available to individuals, 
through the European Commission on Human Rights to the European Court of Human 
Rights. This point was noted by Lord Bridge in Brind :340 
When Parliament has been content for so long to leave those who complain that their convention 
rights have been infringed to seek their remedy in Strasbourg, it would be surprising suddenly to 
find that the judiciary had, without Parliament's aid, the means to incorporate the convention into 
such an important area of domestic law and I cannot escape the conclusion that this would be a 
judicial usurpation of the legislative function. 
By contrast, the Refugee Convention contains no enforcement procedure accessible to 
those affected by decisions about refugee status and refoulemem. It can be enforced only 
internationally through UNHCR or judicially through municipal courts341 . 
In addition, Lord Bridge made a proviso in Brind which left open the back door which 
Lord Ackner purported to close. Lord Bridge noted that the courts are not powerless to 
prevent the exercise of administrative discretion, even when conferred "in terms which 
are on their face unlimited" 342 , in a way which infringes fundamental human rights: 
[l]n deciding whether the Secretary of State, in the exercise of his disc retion , could reasonably 
impose the restriction he has imposed on the broadcast mg orgarnsations, we are ... perfectly 
entitled to start from the premise that any restriction of the right to freedom of expression requires 
to be justified and that nothing less than an important competing public interest will be sufficient 
to justify it. The primary judgment as to whether the particular competing public interest justifies 
the particular restriction ... falls to be made by the Secretary of State . . . But we are entitled to 
exercise a secondary judgment by asking whether a reasonable Secretary of State , on the material 
before him, could reasonably make that primary judgment. 
According to Lord Bridge then, the question of fundamental rights and freedoms is an 
aspect of reasonableness which the courts will take into account. This is not so very 
different to the appellants' argument that the convention is a mandatory relevant 
consideration. Nor are the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised under English 
law343 so different to those set out in the International Bill of Rights or regional human 
rights conventions. If domestic courts can take fundamental rights and freedoms into 
339 Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, above n 340, 20. The Brind complamt was taken to, and 
rejected by, the European Commission on Human Rights. See Applicmion 15404/89 v Ireland (1991) 88 
LS Gaz, 23 October, p 44, noted in Halsbury's Annual Abridgment 1991. 
340 Above n 262, 273. 
341 1n addition, the Asia/Pacific region is the only region of the world without a regional human rights 
convention: The Legal Division, Commonwealth Secretariat "The Application of International Human 
Rights Standards in Domestic Law" in (1992) 22 YUWLR (Monograph No 4 "Essays and Documents on 
Human Rights in the Pacific") 4. 
342 Above. 
343 Halsbury vol 8 paras 827 - 844 pp 547 - 558. 
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account in assessmg the reasonableness of decisions, then it is submitted that whether 
they do so in recognition of "domestic" rights and freedoms recognised by the courts or 
whether they do so in recognition of rights and freedoms set out in international treaties 
is unlike! y to make much difference to the result of judicial decisions in this area344 . 
It is therefore submitted that the courts are as well able to assess the reasonableness of 
decisions with respect to the extent to which those decisions affect the fundamental rights 
and freedoms provided for in international law as they are with respect to domestic rights 
and freedoms. 
4 The Refugee Convention as a mandarory relevant consideration in 
immigration decision-making 
In exerc1smg a discretion, there are some considerations which must be taken into 
account by the decision maker; however, there are also other considerations which the 
decision maker may take into account, but which she is not obliged to take into 
account345 . In Ashby v Minister of Immigration346 , the Court of Appeal rejected the 
argument that the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 1965 was a relevant factor which the Minister was obliged to take into 
account before exercising his discretion whether to grant a permit under the Immigration 
Act. Cooke J doubted whether the Convention was relevant at all347 . 
However, His Honour went on to say348 that in some circumstances, a factor, including 
an international convention, may be a mandatory relevant factor in immigration decision-
making: 
Nevertheless, even in statutes concerned with immigration and policy in that regard , 1 would not 
exclude the possibility that a certain factor might be of such overwhelming or manifest importance 
that Parliament could not possibly have meant to allow it to be ignored. Such a situation would 
344 See above n 283, in which it is pointed out that in many of the cases where this argument has been 
mounted, the decision-maker has complied with the international obligations in any case. 
345 CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] I NZLR 172 (CA). 
346 Above n 186. 
347 Above, 226. 
348 Above. See also Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law" in M 
Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s. Problems and Prospects (1986) 13 -
14: "In ... [Ashby and CREEDN'ZJ it was also accepted or assumed that on a purposive construction of a 
statute a consideration not specified by the legislature may occasionally, in particular circumstances, be 
seen to be of such obvious relevance as to fall within the mandatory category ... Both the distinction for 
Wednesbu,y purposes between prohibited and pennissive considerations and the existence on occasion of 
implied but obviously material mandatory ones were accepted in the House of Lords, per Lord Scarman, in 
1984 in Jn Re Findlay [ 1985] AC 3 I 8". 
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shade into the area where no reasonable Minister could overlook a certain consideration or reach a 
certain result. 
Somers J commented to similar effect that he was349 
prepared to assume (without deciding) that in the exercise of that discretion there may be some 
matters so obviously or manifestly necessary to be taken into account that a Minister acting 
reasonably would be bound to take them into account. 
The Refugee Convention is such a factor350• It is an implied mandatory consideration 
which must be taken into account when the discretion whether to grant a permit under 
the Immigration Act is being exercised. It must also be taken into account across the 
spectrum of immigration decision-making, including the exercise of discretionary powers 
of decision-making about the treatment of refugees who fall within the provisions of 
sections 128, 128A and 128B of the Immigration Act or decisions about removal under 
Part II of the Act. These are all "restrictions on entry" 351 or at least restrictions on the 
ability to remain in New Zealand. In practical terms this means that immigration 
officials must always take into account the refugee's right of access to the determination 
procedure and the duty of non-refoulemenr. 
This is an area in which relevant considerations cannot be determined solely by looking 
at the statute. The Minister, by not legislating, but by choosing to deal with the matter 
under the prerogative, is effectively saying that this is an extra, non-statutory body of 
law which runs in tandem with the Immigration Act. The usual emphasis placed on the 
purpose, scope and policy of the statute352 in assessing whether decisions have been made 
reasonably must be tempered in the area of refugee law as it currently stands in New 
Zealand. Having deliberately left a legislative vacuum in this area and having chosen to 
deal with refugee applications under a system set up by the exercise of prerogative 
powers, the Government cannot then contend that the statute covers the whole field and 
that non-statutory considerations need not be taken into account. 
The Refugee Convention is an internationally-recognised and universal constraint on the 
right of states to control their borders. As Hathaway points out353 , it functions as a 
349 Above n 186, 234. 
350 Indeed, Cooke J's proviso could have been made specifically with the Refugee Convention in mind . 
351 Benipal, above n 21, per Chilwell J . 
352 Wade, above n 185, 408, 412 - 413. 
353 "Refugee law constitutes a narrow exception to [the) norm of autodetermination of inurugration policy. 
[It) is a politically pragmatic means of reconciling the generalized commitment of states to self-mterested 
control over immigration to the reality of coerced migration . . . [G]ovemments have recognized that if they 
are to maintain control over immigration in general terms, they must accommodate demands for entry 
based on particular urgency. To fail to do so is to risk the destruction to (sic) those broader policies of 
control, since laws and institutional arrangements are no match for the desperate creativity of persons in 
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safety valve which ensures the effectiveness of immigration laws generally. The need to 
take account of refugee flows generally and the provisions of the Refugee Convention in 
particular is now an integral part of the functioning of immigration law, policy-making 
and decision-making throughout the world. This is so whether that requirement is 
expressed in legislation such as the Immigration Act or whether it is implied by the 
international reality of and reaction to refugee flows. 
In assessing the reasonableness of the exercise of a discretionary power under the 
Immigration Act, proportionality will also be a factor354. The decision in Bugdaycay can 
be seen in this light. The consequences of refusal of a temporary permit to an ordinary 
applicant are simply that the applicant must remain in her present situation. However, 
the consequences for a refugee of refusal of a permit may be loss of life or freedom or 
continual persecution or continual flight. For this reason, the Convention obligations 
must be taken into account in decision-making in this area. 
It has been submitted that the provisions of the Refugee Convention and the Immigration 
Act are complementary and not in conflict. Because New Zealand is a party to the 
Convention, it must also be assumed by New Zealand courts that in the absence of 
clearly inconsistent domestic legislation, the Government intends to honour its 
international obligations355. 
It is also submitted that even if the current refugee determination procedure had not been 
put into place, the Convention obligations would still be mandatory relevant 
considerations for decision-makers in the immigration area. In Ashby the Convention on 
Racial Discrimination was "of doubtful bearing on the subject"356 of the Minister of 
Immigration's discretion to grant permits to sports players. While the Convention on 
Racial Discrimination and the Refugee Convention both deal with international human 
rights obligations, the appellants' case in Ashby was built around the indirect effect of a 
domestic decision on people in another country. 
Under the Refugee Convention, however, the courts must pronounce on the rights of 
people who are present in New Zealand, who have no remedy at international law and 
who are directly seeking the protection of the New Zealand state from persecution in 
their own countries under the terms of a Convention to which New Zealand is a party. 
flight from serious harm. By catering for a subset of those who seek freedom of international movement, 
refugee law legitimates and sustains the viability of the protectionist norm": J C Hathaway The Law of 
Refugee Sratus (1991) 231. 
354 Taylor, above n 311 para 14.44 p 343. 
355 The Treaty of Waitangi may have a similar status: above, para 14.27 p 328. 
356 Above n 186, 226. 
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The Refugee Convention is of direct, "overwhelming" and "manifest" 357 relevance to 
immigration decisions made by the New Zealand authorities. 
The very specificity of the obligations imposed by the Refugee Convention, its history as 
a instrument developed to deal with a real problem358 and the narrowness of its area of 
operation distinguish it from other international human rights conventions which may be 
aspirational rather than directly effective. 
Judicial support for the contention that the Refugee Convention is a mandatory relevant 
consideration comes from the reasoning in Benipal. In Benipal Chilwell J concluded 
that:359 
the decision of the Minister of Immigration was made on a prelimmary issue the determination of 
which , favourably to Mr Benipal , would have required detemunation of hi s residence in New 
Zealand on a temporary or permanent basis ... Restri ctions on entry and the Convention arc 
inseparable. 
His Honour found360 that Mr Benipal had legitimate expectations based inter alia on the 
existence of the New Zealand Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status Under 
International Instruments sent to the United Nations and published by that international 
body in a summary form. These legitimate expectations were that his application for 
refugee status would be dealt with procedurally fairly and determined fairly ; that his 
application, having been initially assessed as one which fell to be considered in terms of 
the definition of refugee, gave him prima facie grounds for claiming the status of 
refugee; and that he had bona fide and substantial grounds for claiming refugee status in 
terms of the definition of refugee and that he would receive a favourable decision. 
Chilwell J appears to be saying that the international holding out by New Zealand that it 
had put the provisions of the Refugee Convention into effect was sufficient to create a 
legitimate expectation on the part of refugee applicants who arrive in New Zealand that 
the provisions of the Convention will be honoured in determination of that applicant's 
refugee status. 
While it appears that, in Benipal, the argument that the Convention was an obligatory 
relevant consideration which must be taken into account when the discretion to grant a 
permit is exercised was never put before the court, in my opinion Chilwell J's finding 
357 Ashby, above. 
358 See JC Hathaway "The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920 - 1950" (1984) 33 
ICLQ348. 
359 Benipal , above n 21, 24 7. 
360 Above, 302 - 303. 
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that the Convention and restrictions on entry (ie the requirement to hold a permit under 
the Immigration Act) are inseparable amounts to the same thing. 
The submission that the Refugee Convention is a mandatory relevant consideration m 
immigration decision-making is not likely to be tested as long as the current refugee 
status determination procedures are in effect and are operated fairly by NZIS . In the 
event that that the determination procedures are not operated fairly or are amended in 
such a way that the protections afforded refugee applicants are cut down, the submission 
that the Refugee Convention is a mandatory relevant consideration may need to be 
tested. 
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IV ENDING 
This paper seeks to establish that the Refugee Convention (including its two most 
important requirements, the requirement to establish a fair determination procedure to 
assess whether asylum seekers are refugees as defined in the Refugee Convention and the 
duty of non-refoulement) is now part of New Zealand law. 
Legislation in this area is nevertheless desirable361 . Judicial decision-making in this area 
of the law recognises that "[i]mmigration is a difficult field of public policy which is no 
doubt better regulated by Parliament than the courts" 362 . The failure to legislate means 
that issues which have not been definitively pronounced on by the courts remain 
unresolved. This creates uncertainty for refugee applicants, for the non-governmental 
organisations working in this area, and for those who have the responsibility for making 
decisions on questions which may, literally, be matters of life and death. 
36! The arguments in favour of legislation are summarised comprehensively in the Legislation Advisory 
Committee submission on the Immigration Amendment Bill I 991 to the Labour Select Committee (August 
1991), 6 - 11. The Wilson report (above n 94, I 8 - 19 and 2 I) also states that legislation is desirable. 
362 Wade, 578. 
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APPENDIX 1 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CONCLUSION ON DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE 
STATUS 19771 
The Committee: 
(a) Noted the report of the High Commissioner concerning the importance of 
procedures for determining refugee status. 
(b) Noted that only a limited number of States parties to the 195 l Convention and the 
1967 Protocol had established procedures for the formal determination of refugee status 
under these instruments. 
(c) Noted, however, with satisfaction that the establishment of such procedures was 
under active consideration by a number of governments. 
(d) Expressed the hope that all governments parties to the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol which had not yet done so would take steps to establish such procedures in 
the near future and give favourable consideration to UNHCR participation in such 
procedures in appropriate form. 
(e) Recommended that procedures for the determination of refugee status should 
satisfy the following basic requirements: 
(i) The competent official (eg immigration officer or border police officer) to whom 
the applicant addresses himself (sic) at the border or in the territory of a Contracting 
State, should have clear instructions for dealing with cases which might come within the 
purview of the relevant international instruments. He should be required to act in 
accordance with the principle of non-refoulement and to refer such cases to a higher 
authority. 
(ii) The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to the procedure to be 
followed. 
1 Report on the Twenty-Eighth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme (Geneva, 4 - 12 October 1977) A/AC. 96 /549, Conclusion No 6, 14. 
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(iii) There should be a clearly identified authority - wherever possible a single central 
authority - with responsibility for examining requests for refugee status and taking a 
decision in the first instance. 
(iv) The applicant should be given the necessary facilities, including the services of a 
competent interpreter, for submitting his case to the authorities concerned. Applicants 
should also be given the opportunity, of which they should be duly informed, to contract 
a representative of UNHCR. 
(v) If the applicant is recognised as a refugee, he should be informed accordingly and 
issued with documentation certifying his refugee status . 
(vi) If the applicant is not recognised, he should be given a reasonable time to appeal 
for a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different 
authority , whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system. 
(vii) The applicant should be permitted to remain in the country pending a decision on 
his initial request by the competent authority referred to in paragraph (iii) above, unless 
it has been established by that authority that his request is clearly abusive. He should 
also be permitted to remain in that country while an appeal to a higher administrative 
authority or to the courts is pending. 
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APPENDIX 2 
REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY: TERMS OF REFERENCE 
(1 APRIL 1992) 
Composition 
1. The Authority shall comprise members appointed by the Minister of Immigration 
from time to time, consisti'ng of a Chairperson from outside Government and such other 
independent members as are necessary for the Authority to operate as a number of 
divisions . 
2. For the purpose of any one appeal two members of the Authority shall sit, being a 
Chairperson and one other member. The Chairperson may appoint where necessary one 
or more members as Chairpersons for the operation of divisions. 
3. A representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees may sit on 
hearings where that representative so wishes, as a non-voting participant. 
4. The Authority shall be serviced by a unit in the Refugee Status Section of the New 
Zealand Immigration Service, under the direction of the General Manager of the Service, 
and that unit shall serve as the Secretariat of the Authority . 
Function and Jurisdiction 
5. The Authority's function shall be to make a final determination on appeal from 
decisions of officers of the Refugee Status Section of the New Zealand Immigration 
Service of claims to refugee status , that is, to determine whether persons are refugees 
within the meaning of Article 1, Section A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, as supplemented by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. It shall not be a function of the Authority to consider whether, in respect of 
claimants who are not refugees within the above meanings, there exist any humanitarian 
or other circumstances which could lead to the grant of a residence or other permit to 
remain in New Zealand. 
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6. The Authority shall consider only those claims to refugee status where the claimants 
have been declined refugee status by officers of the Refugee Status Section and are not 
otherwise granted residence in New Zealand and where the claimants have lodged written 
appeals with the Secretariat of the Authority within 15 working days of being notified of 
the decision of their claims. 
7 . The Authority shall not consider claims to refugee status where the claimants are 
appealing to the Authority on a second occasion, or on any occasion in respect of a case 
at any stage decided by the Interdepartmental Committee on Refugees. 
Procedure 
8. In determining claims to refugee status, the Authority shall consider each written 
decision of officers of the Refugee Status Section that is subject to appeal and any 
material submitted in writing by the claimant in support of the appeal and by the Refugee 
Status Section in support of its decision. The Authority shall interview the claimant and 
consider any evidence presented by the claimant unless the claim is prima facie 
manifestly unfounded or frivolous or vexatious , or manifestly well-founded. Where the 
authority interviews claimants (who may be accompanied by their representatives should 
they so wish), officers of the Refugee Status Section shall also be entitled to give 
evidence in person to the Authority. The Authority may question officers of the Refugee 
Status Section and, if necessary, other officers of government on the issues before the 
Authority , provided however that any information to be used by such officer before the 
Authority which may be prejudicial to the claimant's appeal shall be put to the claimant 
within a reasonable time before the interview for comment unless it is necessary to 
withhold that information for any of the reasons specified in section 6(a) to (d) of the 
Official Information Act 1982. 
9. The Authority may, in relation to any appeal, request the Refugee Status Section to 
seek to obtain further information or to carry out further investigations and report to the 
Authority. If, in the opinion of the General Manager of the New Zealand Immigration 
Service in any such case, it is not practicable to obtain or to seek to obtain the 
information or to carry out the investigation, the Refugee Status Section shall report 
according! y to the Authority. 
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10. The Authority shall give to each claimant at least 10 working days notice of the date 
on which the appeal is to be considered and of the date of any hearing involving the 
claimant. 
11. The Refugee Status Section shall be responsible for the provision of an independent 
interpreter required at any hearing. 
12. A decision of the Authority shall be a decision of the members hearing an appeal. 
Where members are unable to agree on a decision, the outcome shall be in favour of the 
claimant (that is, refugee status shall be granted). The decision of the Authority shall be 
either to grant or to decline refugee status. A decision of the Authority shall not be 
reconsidered by the Authority once conveyed to the appellant. 
13. Subject to these Terms of Reference, the Authority may regulate its own procedure 
and receive such evidence and conduct any hearings in such manner as it thinks fit. 
14. The Authority shall endeavour to make a decision on any appeal within a period of 
8 weeks from the lodging of the appeal. 
15. The decision of the Authority on every appeal, together with the reasons for it, shall 
be recorded in writing by the Secretariat and approved by the Authority . The Refugee 
Status Section shall provide a copy of the record to the claimant (or any representative of 
the claimant) and shall be responsible for informing the Minister of Immigration and the 
Minister of External Relations and Trade of the outcome of every appeal. 
16. These terms of reference shall come into force on 1 April 1992, rescinding those 
under which the Authority previously operated except that where hearings have begun in 
respect of an appeal on or before that date the previous terms of reference shall continue 
to apply. 
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APPENDIX 3 
BEN/PAL V MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IMMIGRATION1: 
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND FINDINGS 
Mr Benipal arrived in New Zealand by plane on 15 May 1983, having passed through 
Pakistan, Iran, Austria, Belgium and Holland (where he purchased a Netherlands 
passport and altered it for his own use). Benipal travelled with a Mr Sangra. Both were 
Sikhs and members of the National Council of Khalistan. Mr Benipal had been 
imprisoned and tortured by government authorities in India because of his political 
activities. After being interviewed at the airport (where Chilwell J found Benipal asked 
for refugee status2), Mr Benipal and Mr Sangra were arrested for illegally entering New 
Zealand, and held in Mt Eden prison. 
Representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and immigration officials 
interviewed Mr Benipal. They subsequently provided a report to ICOR, which 
recommended to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Immigration that the applications 
for refugee status of Benipal and Sangra be declined on the grounds that "neither 
applicant had pointed to a sufficiently high level of activity distinguishing them from 
thousands of other participants in the movement or warranting their being viewed as 
leaders of their movement" 3 • 
The recommendation was accepted, and the immigration authorities began to make 
arrangements for Benipal to be removed from New Zealand. This proved to be a 
problem, since he did not have a valid passport. He remained in custody. Mr Sangra, 
who had an Indian passport, was removed and his fate is unknown. 
Mr McLoughlin, a journalist, learned of Benipal' s situation and made submissions on his 
behalf to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry made inquiries of the West 
German government and an officer of the Ministry prepared a further, highly prejudicial, 
report. It stated that the Khalistan movement was "banned", and a "violent" 
1 (Unreported , 26 November 1985, High Court, Auckland Registry, Chilwell J, A 878/83 , A 993 /83 , A 
1016/83). 
2 Above 98 . 
3 Above, 5. 
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organisation4 • McLaughlin and Amnesty International submitted further information, 
and eventually the Ministers agreed that ICOR should reconsider the matter at a second 
hearing at Mt Eden prison. 
The Committee again concluded that Benipal did not have a well-founded fear of 
persecution and that only prominent leaders of the Sikh movement would be eligible for 
refugee status. The Ministers confirmed the declination of refugee status, and further 
arrangements for removal were made (intitially without informing Benipal or his 
advisers). Benipal applied for a writ of habeas corpus and for interim relief and for the 
decisions of the Ministers and the ICOR to be quashed. 
The respondent Ministers argued that the Court had "no jurisdiction to review the 
decision of the Minister respondents or the functions of the Interdepartmental Committee 
insofar as it is contended that such jurisdiction arises from the infringment of "rights" 
conferred on Mr Benipal by the Convention"5, relying on the (then) recent decision of 
the High Court of Australia in Simsek v Minsrer for lmmigrarion And Erhnic Affairs. 
Simsek had applied for an interlocutory injunction to prevent his deportation pending the 
hearing of review proceedings, arguing that treaties conferring rights upon an individual 
could do so directly, while treaties imposing obligations upon an individual did not 
directly affect municipal law. Stephen J found that the Convention and Protocol did not 
impose obligations on the Minister nor did it confer rights on the applicant which were 
enforceable in the Courts. 
Chilwell J distinguished Simsek on several grounds, including "the current more 
restricted approach to legitimate expectation in Australia" 6 . Counsel for Benipal pointed 
out that Mr Simsek's case was based directly on the Convention; he "took the 'high 
road' and based his case on international law" 7 • Mr Benipal, on the other hand, based 
his argument on New Zealand municipal law; that Benipal' s application for refugee 
status was in reality an application for permission to stay in New Zealand and the issue 
4 Above, 141. 
5 Above 268 . 
6 Above 272; the judgment in Benipal was ddivered on 26 November 1985 . The Judgment of the High 
Court of Australia in Kioa v Minis1er of /mmigrmion and Elhnic Affairs ( 1985) 62 ALR 321 was delivered 
on 18 December 1985. 
7 Above 269 . 
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was the basis on which the Minister of Immigration exercised a statutory power of 
decision, namely his discretion whether to issue a permit8 . 
This line of argument avoided the necessity of trying to establish, as Mr Simsek had 
attempted to do, that the Refugee Convention had effect domestically. It also avoided 
the need to establish that the exercise of prerogative power was reviewable. At the time 
of the hearing, the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service9 clarifying this point had not been made, athough it 
featured prominently in subsequent written submissions and in the Benipal judgment 
itself. 
Chilwell J made two alternative findings. He found first 10 that the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Immigration were exercising statutory powers of decision: 
[T]he decision of the Minister of Immigration was made on a preliminary issue [that is, his status 
as a refugee] the determination of which, favourably to Mr Benipal, would have required 
determination of his residence in New Zealand on a temporary or permanent basis. If the nations 
of the world placed no restrictions on the entry of people to their countries there would be no need 
for the Convention. It is precisely because nations do impose restrictions upon entry that 
something had to be done in regard to refugees. Restrictions on entry and the Convention are 
inseparable. 
He also found that, even if the Ministers were exercising non-statutory powers in dealing 
with Mr Benipal' s application for refugee status, their decisions were reviewable 11 • 
Chilwell J12 found that the application was not properly dealt with by the Ministers. His 
Honour found that Mr Benipal had been treated unfairly inter alia in that immigration 
officials had failed to give him adequate guidance in filling out his application for 
refugee status or an adequate opportunity to give as much detail as he wished; the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative discouraged him from obtaining legal 
assistance during the first interview; he was not supplied with a copy of the interview 
report, nor several subsequent reports and other prejudicial information made available 
8 Above 243. In the course of arguing that the question at issue was the exercise of a statutory power of 
decision, it was submitted for Benipal that "for the purposes of domestic law, refugee applications are not 
dealt with under the prerogative": 246. This is not correct and Chilwell J did not so find. 
9 [1985] AC 374 (HL); [1984] 3 All ER 935, hereafter CCSU cited to All ER. The CCSU decision was 
delivered on 22 November 1984. See Chilwell J's comments on the effect of the CCSU decision, above n 
l, 262. 
lO Above n 1, 247. 
11 Above 273. 
12 After 4 days of interlocutory hearings and 22 days of hearing on the substantive issues, in a 382-page 
decision. 
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to ICOR; and in that ICOR did not give him an opportunity to be heard before it made 
an adverse recommendation to the Ministers. 
When the matter was reconsidered, the Committee "did not pay attention and listen to 
some of the evidence given by Mr Benipal and Mr McLaughlin", "had closed minds ... 
and did not take his application seriously" 13. The "entire decision making process [was] 
unfair" 14 • Chilwell J found that the Ministers, in adopting the Committee's flawed 
recommendations, compounded the errors of law committed by ICOR
15 and, in relation 
to the Minister of Immigration, found that there was a real likelihood or reasonable 
suspicion of bias 16 , in th.at the Minister had predetermined that he would reject the 
application after the re-hearing by the Committee. 
He also found that the Ministers and ICOR misdirected themselves as to the criteria 
specified in the 1951 Convention. The Committee substituted its own opinion about 
whether the applicant had engaged in political activities, not whether the ruling 
government of the country of origin considered the activity to be political. 
The applications to quash the decisions of the Ministers and of ICOR were granted. The 
Court al so made a declaration 17 
binding on the Minister Respondents and the Interdepartmental Committee on Refugees that the 
Applicant is a person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion 
and political opinion is outside the country of his nationality ... and, owing to such fear, ,s 
unwilling to avail himself of the proteetion of that country. 
An appeal against the decision was lodged, but was unsuccessful. By the time the appeal 
was heard, Mr Benipal had been granted residence and the Court of Appeal held that the 
question of whether his application for refugee status had been properly dealt with was 
no longer a live issue 18 . 
13 Above 372. 
14 Above 375. 
l5 Above 232 and 375. 
16 Above 3 L9. 
17 Above 380. 
18 Minister of Foreign Affairs v Benipal [ 1988] 2 NZLR 222. 
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APPENDIX 4 
SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE EXERC! 
NATURE AND REVIEW ABILITY OF CROWN PREROGA TIVE1 
1 Constitutional principles relating to the exercise of Crown prerogative 
The powers of the Crown must either be derived from Act of Parliament or 
recognised as a matter of common law. Prerogative is a matter of common law and d 
he prero 
reserve 
he cate~ 
ot be ex 
[I] 
!in 
thf 
exl 
not derive from statute2• "The right of the executive to do a lawful act affecting O moSt 
rights of the citizen, whether adversely or beneficially, is founded on the giving to hich en 
executive of a power enabling it to do that act. The giving of such a power usu onsider 1 
carries with it legal sanctions to enable that power if necessary to be enforced by rown' s 
courts. In most cases that power is derived from statute though in some cases ... it 
still be derived from the prerogative" 3 . Prerogative powers are exercised either by 
sovereign4 or, according to constitutional practice, more often by those hold 
ministerial rank5 . 
ea, 
to 
Olli 
pre 
hose pn 
The legal doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament means that the extent e prero1 
the use of the prerogative may be curtailed at any stage and in any manner ppointm1 
legislation6 • Parliamentary legislation or the carrying out of statutory obligations gal autt 
not be suspended by the exercise of prerogative power7. Statute prevails over ay also 
prerogative. Where legislation deals with a subject which may also be dealt ·mply as 
with under the prerogative, the Government must exercise the statutory powers, not 
1 This appendix is a brief summary of points which are relevant to the thesis put forward in the researc 
paper. The writer found E C S Wade and AW Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law ( 10 ed, 
1985) 245 (hereafter, Bradley) and Halsbury's Laws of Engla11d (4 ed) vol 8 Constitutional Law (herea 
Halsbury vol 8) to be helpful and accessible authorities on crown prerogative. 
2 "The King hath no prerogative but what the law of the land allows him" : Case of Proclama1ions (16 
12 Co Rep 74. 
Auomey-
CCSU pe 
Halsbuf' 
88 whicl 
3 Councilfor Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985] AC 374 (HL); [1984) 3 All 
935, hereafter CCSU cited to All ER 955 - 956, per Lord Roskill. For a brief history of the developiD 
of prerogative powers, see Bradley 245 - 247 . ;nain.ing P 
4 In New Zealand, the Governor-General as the sovereign's personal representative: New Zealand e residue I 
''t ' 
Commentary on Hals bury 's Laws of Engla11d ( 1985) Binder C, Constitutional Law, para C 12 (hereafte exerciSi 
11sritutio, 
"New Zealand Commentary"). 
5 CCSU per Lord Diplock, 949 - 950. CCSU R 
6 Bradley, 247. Buri v Ci 
7 Fi1zgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615. Halsbu, 
Above, I 
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. ment or 
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he prerogative power8 although the two powers may co-exist9 • A statute may expressly 
reserve the right to act under the prerogative10• 
he categories of the prerogative are closed and the exercise of prerogative power may 
ot be extended into new areas 11 : 
[I]t is 350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen's courts to broaden the prerogative. The 
limits within which the executive government may impose obligations or restraints on citizens of 
the United Kingdom without any statutory authority are now well settled and incapable of 
extension . 
affecting o most lawyers, prerogative powers are all the non-statutory powers of the Crown 
siving to 1hich enable the government to function 12 . Some commentators (notably Wade13) 
)wer usu onsider that the prerogative comprises a narrower class of powers than simply all of the 
)reed by rown' s non-statutory powers. Blackstone said 14 that the term 
es .. . it 
=ither by 
1ose hold 
can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone , in contradistinction 
to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects; for if once any 
one prerogative of the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would cease to be 
prerogative any longer. 
hose prerogative powers relating to "the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, 
te extent e prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours , the dissolution of Parliament and the 
manner ppointment of ministers" 15 are "pure and strict" 16 prerogative powers. The Crown's 
igations gal authority to carry out the executive and administrative functions of government 
tils over ay also be described as a prerogative power17 . Some executive acts may be described 
mply as the Crown's exercise of common law rights and powers 18 . 
!rs, not 
Artomey-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel (1920] AC 508. 
CCSU per Lord Roskill at 956 . 
Halsbury vol 8 para 91 p 584. For a New Zealand example, see s 13 of the External Relations Act 
Law (herea 88 which provides: "Nothing in this Act extinguishes any power or authority that , if this Act had not 
en passed, would be exercisable by virtue of the prerogative of the Crown ". 
nations (16 BBC v Johns (1965] Ch 32, per Diplock U , 79; Bradley, above n 254. 
Bradley, 245 . 
984] 3 All H WR Wade Administrative law (6 ed, 1988) 241 - 242 (hereafter, Wade). 
: developm BI Comm 1.239, cited in Wade, above, 241. Dicey defined the prerogative in broader terms as "the 
maining portion of the Crown's original authority , and is therefore , as already pointed out, the name for 
',ealand e residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown, whether such power be in 
l2 (hereafte , t exercised by the King himself or by his Minister": Introduction to the Study of the law of the 
nstiturion (8 ed, 1915) 421, cited by Lord Fraser in CCSU, 941. 
CCSU per Lord Roskill at 956 . 
Burr v Governor-General of New Zealand (Unreported, 16 July 1992, CA 175/88) , 10. 
Halsbury, vol 8 para 1152 p 711 . 
Above, para 931 p 599 . See also Bradley , 247 . 
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The same action of the Crown may be categorised by some commentators as be· ouse of 
derived from prerogative powers, while others describe them as simply Crown exerc' eview rr 
of common law rights. For example, Wade 19 considers that the power to employ pu rerogati 
servants is no more than anyone's common law power to employ servants while Bradl 
considers that "the legal relationship between the Crown and Crown servants ... difD ther Ne 
markedly from the normal contractual relationship between employer and employee" inally dii 
this would therefore be a "pure and strict" prerogative power. ealand3° 
ase are a 
Lord Diplock considered that the argument whether prerogative powers include o udgment 
those powers peculiar to the Crown, or whether they include all non-statutory powe 
was of little practical legal relevance today21 . 
2 Reviewabiliry of the exercise of prerogarive power 
Ho 
fao 
Co 
he findi1 
· · ·d ed h h d. · f h f h udicial re At one time It was cons1 er t at t e 1rect exercise o t e powers o t e prerogat 
was "irresistible and absolute" 22 and therefore unreviewable23 and that the remedy s examm 
abuse of the prerogative was a political and not a legal remedy24 . It has been recogni n CCSU. 
for some time that the decisions of tribunals and other officials whose authority ould all 1 
derived from the exercise of Crown prerogative are reviewable25 . The traditional vi aw powei 
that a direct exercise of the prerogative was not reviewable is no longer correct26 . di fJ 
of 
the 
po! In Benipal Chilwell J found that the decisions of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
Immigration were reviewable by way of the exercise of the prerogative remedies 
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition even if they were not exercising statutory pow n determ 
of decision. 27 His Honour referred to the then recent decision of the majority of the ot the so 
19 Above n 13, 392. 
20 Above n 1, 247. 
21 ccsu 950. 
22 Above 955. 
23 Burt v Governor-General of New 'Zealand, above n 16, 6. 
24 CCSU, per Lord Roskill at 955. 
ecision. 
25 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, exp Lain [1967] 2 QB 864; [1967] 2 All ER 770; per Above,: 
Parker CJ at 777, cited to All ER. For a New Zealand example of a tribunal set up under the prerogall Foreign ; 
see the decision of Barker J in Silke Ali v Minister of Immigration (unreported, 13 December 1991, Hig rd, Benir 
Court, Auckland, M 2270/91 in which he noted at 7 that the fact that the Refugee Status Appeal Authot1 definitely) 
"has solemnly been established by Government decree means that its existence cannot be ignored; not be G D S T: 
a body exercising statutory power, its decisions could not be susceptible to judicial review but only to tb Above n 
prerogative writs". Burt, abc 
26 Burt, above n 16. Above n 
27 (Unreported, 26 November 1985, High Court, Auckland Registry, Chilwell J, A 878/83, A 993 /83, CCSU, a 
1016/83) 273. Burt, abc 
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rs as bei ouse of Lords in CCSU "that executive action is not necessarily immune from judicial 
w[ n exerc' eview merely because it was carried out in pursuance of a power derived from a 
ploy pub rerogative source"28 . 
1ile Brad! 
s ... difD ther New Zealand courts had some difficulty applying CCSU29 and the issue was not 
mployee" inally disposed of until the Court of Appeal decision in Bun v Governor-General of New 
ealand3°. Burt is a decision about the prerogative of mercy, but the principles of this 
ase are applicable to the exercise of the prerogative generally. Cooke P, delivering the 
1clude o udgment of the Court of Appeal, said31 that: 
)ry powe 
However, as to prerogative powers generally, it has become accepted in recent years that the mere 
fact that a decision has been made under the prerogative does not exempt it from review in the 
Courts. The test is rather whether the subject-matter of the decision is justiciable. 
he finding that the source of power for any action is the prerogative does not preclude 
udicial review of that action, but the grounds for review may be narrower where a court prerogat 
d s examining a use of the prerogative than where a statutory power is being reviewed
32 
reme y 
. n CCSU, Lord Dip lock stated that illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety recogm 
rnthority ould all be grounds for judicial review of decisions taken under prerogative or common 
.tional vi w powers, although with respect to irrationality he found it33 
:t26. 
Affairs 
·emedies 
difficult to envisage in any of the various fields in which the prerogative remains the only source 
of the relevant decision-making power a decision of a kind that would be open to attack through 
the judicial process on this ground. Such decisions will generally involve the application of public 
policy" and "the judicial process is [not] adapted to provide the right answer" to such questions . 
ory pow determining reviewability and the grounds for review, what is important therefore is 
of the ot the source of the power under which a decision is made, but the subject-matter of the 
ecision. Even a refusal to exercise the prerogative of mercy may be reviewable34 . 
770; per Above, 264. The Crown did not accept this finding and appealed, but the Court of Appeal in Minister 
prerogall Poreign Affairs v Benipal [ 1988] 2 NZLR 222 refused to consider the issue. By the time the appeal was 
1991, Hig rd, Benipal had been granted a residence permit (and therefore had the right to remain in New Zealand 
!al Authon definitely). The issue before the Court was therefore by that stage purely academic. 
red; not b GD S Taylor Judicial Review (1991) para 1.08 p 7. 
t only to 1 1 Above n 16. 
Burt, above, 9. 
Above n 16, 10. See also Bradley, 255. 
A 993/83, CCSU, above n 3, 951. 
Burt, above n 16, 15. 
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3 The nature of prerogative powers 
Within the limited range of areas in which the Crown may exercise prerogative powe 
the Crown may act in a manner which is legislative35 or akin to legislation. An exam 
of legislation authorised by the prerogative is described in CCSU where the Minister 
the Civil Service altered the terms and conditions of work at GCHQ by acting pursu 
to the Civil Service Order in Council 1982. This Order in Council had been issued 
the sovereign by virtue of her prerogative on the advice of the government36 . 
A proclamation or other document issued by the Crown under prerogative powers 
which the force of law is claimed may be examined by the courts, who have the power 
determine whether such documents have legal effect and are legally binding 
"Prerogative legislation" is to this extent different to Acts of Parliament, which 
supreme and not subject to judicial analysis in this way3K. 
The Order in Council in CCSU was "primary legislation [which] derives its authon 
from the sovereign alone and not, as is more commonly the case with legislation, fr 
the sovereign in Parliament"39 • The setting up of tribunals under the prerogative40 
akin to legislation and the terms of reference of those bodies have a statute-like effect. 
Some prerogative decisions are similar to judicial decisions41 , while others are executi 
or administrative decisions. Other powers can only be described as unique to the Crov 
such as the granting of honours or the conclusion of international treaties. Whl 
Parliament can only legislate, and cannot act judicially (except to enforce Parliamenta 
privilege) or administratively, the exercise of prerogative powers can be legislativ 
judicial, administrative or, simply, prerogative42 . 
35 Bradley, 48. 
36 Per Lord Fraser, 941. 
37 Case of Proclamations, above n 2; see Bradley, 60. 
38 Bradley, 59. 
39 Per Lord Fraser, 942. 
4o For example, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board set up "under the prerogative" to compensatt 
victims of violent crime in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board exp lain, above n 25, and the 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority in New Zealand. 
41 For example, the granting of the prerogative of mercy . 
42 Halsbury, vol 8 para 8 I 4 p 53 7. 
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